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Abstract
Most of today’s wireless communication devices operate on unlicensed bands with unco-
ordinated spectrum access, with the consequence that RF interference and collisions are
impairing the overall performance of wireless networks. In the classical design of network
protocols, both packets in a collision are considered lost. However, with the current prolif-
eration of wireless applications, e.g., wlans, car-to-car networks, or the Internet of Things,
this conservative approach is increasingly limiting the achievable network performance in
practice. Instead of shunning interference, this thesis questions the notion of „harmful“
interference and argues that interference can, when generated in a controlled manner, be
used to increase the performance and security of wireless systems. Using results from
information theory and communications engineering, we identify the causes for reception
or loss of packets and apply these insights to design system architectures that benefit from
interference. Because the effect of signal propagation and channel fading, receiver design
and implementation, and higher layer interactions on reception performance is complex and
hard to reproduce by simulations, we design and implement an experimental platform for
controlled interference generation to strengthen our theoretical findings with experimental
results. Following this philosophy, we introduce and evaluate a system architecture that
leverage interference. First, we identify the conditions for successful reception of concurrent
transmissions in wireless networks. We focus on the inherent ability of angular modulation
receivers to reject interference when the power difference of the colliding signals is suffi-
ciently large, the so-called capture effect . Because signal power fades over distance, the
capture effect enables two or more sender–receiver pairs to transmit concurrently if they are
positioned appropriately, in turn boosting network performance. Second, we show how to
increase the security of wireless networks with a centralized network access control system
(called WiFire) that selectively interferes with packets that violate a local security policy,
thus effectively protecting legitimate devices from receiving such packets. WiFire’s working
principle is as follows: a small number of specialized infrastructure devices, the guardians,
are distributed alongside a network and continuously monitor all packet transmissions in
the proximity, demodulating them iteratively. This enables the guardians to access the
packet’s content before the packet fully arrives at the receiver. Using this knowledge the
guardians classify the packet according to a programmable security policy. If a packet is
deemed malicious, e.g., because its header fields indicate an unknown client, one or more
guardians emit a limited burst of interference targeting the end of the packet, with the
objective to introduce bit errors into it. Established communication standards use frame
check sequences to ensure that packets are received correctly; WiFire leverages this built-in
behavior to prevent a receiver from processing a harmful packet at all. This paradigm of
„over-the-air“ protection without requiring any prior modification of client devices enables
novel security services such as the protection of devices that cannot defend themselves
because their performance limitations prohibit the use of complex cryptographic protocols,
or of devices that cannot be altered after deployment.
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1.1. Motivation
Wireless networks are growing in importance at a rapid pace, and wireless
technologies are becoming pervasive in our daily lifes. This process leads to
the situation that wireless connectivity is increasingly used in security-critical
contexts. However, providing security in wireless networks is generally harder
to achieve compared to wired networks. Due to the broadcast nature of radio
frequency (RF) propagation, network access cannot be regulated physically;
anyone in transmission range can eavesdrop or inject arbitrary messages.1
The current response to this threat is to use strong cryptographic protection
to ensure that messages remain confidential and that only authorized parties
can participate in a network. This approach, however, is not always easily
applicable because wireless devices have several unique characteristics: (i) the
devices often have limited computational resources and are optimized for a
particular application, (ii) they run on batteries and thus have the primary
goal to maximize lifetime, (iii) they may have limited programmability or
cannot be modified at all, (iv) they may be mobile and travel across different
security domains, and (v) they are often personal belongings that are operated
and configured by (possibly security-oblivious) end users. It is hard to imagine
that devices such as sensor motes, RFID chips or implanted medical devices
implement a full range of security measures despite these challenges. Their
1For example, researchers were able to eavesdrop on Bluetooth phone calls from more than
a mile away: http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2004/08/64463.
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protection task is highly asymmetric because all security protocols must be
implemented on each resource-limited device while the adversary can use
high-performance systems. This thesis sets out to address these issues with
a remote protection system that takes over the burden of protection from
the low-power devices, especially for devices in the context of wireless sensor
networks (WSNs).
Security in Wireless Sensor Networks
WSNs are extending their application scope from industrial monitoring and
location tracking to more personal and assistant technologies, such as in
health care (Chipara et al., 2010), assisted living (Hnat et al., 2011; Wood
et al., 2008), and home energy saving applications (Jiang et al., 2009; Lu,
Sookoor, et al., 2010). ZigBee-enabled devices such as door locks, occupancy
sensors, panic buttons and electrical sockets are already available as low-cost
consumer electronics ready to be deployed in users’ residences. Imagine an
emergency scenario where a gas leakage detector rises an alarm or a panic
button is pressed, and since an occupancy sensor reports an occupied room,
the door lock system decides to unlock and provide emergency exits. While
such a scenario is a perfect motivation for using WSN technologies, it also
provides an attractive playground for an attacker.
In contrast to wired networks where physical control of traffic is inher-
ently given, wireless networks are open by nature. For this reason, both
ieee .. (at the link-layer) and ZigBee (at the upper layers) define
conventional security services for frame protection, device authorization, key
distribution, and key establishment. However, they also take into account
restrictions of battery-powered, performance-limited and low-cost devices
and offer tradeoffs between resource requirements and security objectives,
depending on the particular application scenario. For example, according to
the ieee .. standard, there are three security modes: (i) no security,
(ii) access control lists (ACLs) based on a source address, and (iii) secured
mode, offering a choice of strong security suites such as 128 bit aes-ccm.
From a security perspective, only the latter option offers protection in an
adversarial setting. Similarly, the ZigBee-2007 specification describes key
management and key exchange methods. It specifies three types of keys: (i)
master key, used as an initial shared secret to generate link keys, (ii) link
key, dynamically generated secret keys shared only between two devices, and
(iii) network key, a global secret key shared among all WSN devices. Yet,
the master and link keys are optional. Hence, it is realistic to assume that
the security of standard ZigBee networks may reside in only a single shared
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key with the obvious risk that the capture of a single device and extraction
of the secret key could jeopardize the security of the whole network. Along
these lines, a recently available security analysis toolbox called KillerBee
(Wright, 2010) offers a set of attack vectors, such as Over-the-Air (OTA)
key sniffing, MAC address manipulation, key extraction from memory, and
denial-of-service attacks based on flooding WSNs with memory-consuming
association requests.
1.2. The Concept of Firewalls
Given this plethora of security issues, a new security paradigm is needed that
offers protection even in the face of severe resource limitations. Ideally, what
you want is an external guardian system that supports devices in their task
of protecting themselves. A wish list of its features may be:
• remote protection for several devices in parallel,
• support for generic and programmable security policies, and
• transparent operation; no changes to the existing devices should be
necessary.
Remote protection helps to off-load security costs in terms of energy, storage,
and computation time to an external security infrastructure, programmable
security policies enable an easy adaptation to new technologies or threats,
and transparent operation ensures that any wireless device, even a legacy
device or a device with fixed programming, can be protected this way. In
wired networks, many of these properties are found within the concept of
network firewalls.
Firewalls
Firewalls are located at the edges of networks, controlling the access to the
networks they are to protect, effectively defining a trust boundary between
inside and outside world. To that end, firewalls analyze in- and outbound
packet streams and classify into trusted and untrusted traffic, blocking the
latter. A comprehensive definition of firewall is given by Bellovin and
Cheswick (1994). They define a firewall as a collection of components
placed between two networks that collectively have the following properties:
• All traffic from inside to outside, and vice versa, must pass through the
firewall.
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Figure 1.1.: The firewall concept in wired networks.
• Only authorized traffic, as defined by the local security policy, will be
allowed to pass.
• The firewall itself is immune to penetration.
This principle is depicted in Figure 1.1. The local network on the right is
protected by a central firewall that bridges all access from the untrusted
outside network and controls all incoming traffic. Attacks from the untrusted
network can be detected and filtered before malicious traffic can arrive to any
of the protected nodes. Network administrators are generally very much in
favor of firewalls as they enable a central control of policy enforcement. This
is, in principle, achieved in a transparent way, without necessitating changes
to existing protocols or host configurations. A firewall’s actions are usually
specified by generic policies defined by filtering rules.
1.3. A Firewall for Wireless Networks
From the previous discussion, it is hard to deny that the concept of enforcing
security policies by blocking unwanted traffic before it reaches the clients
could also be attractive in supporting a practical approach to wireless network
security. A noteworthy property of the firewall concept is the basic assumption
that one cannot rely on the end systems to run correctly implemented and
configured security software. This assumption is even more satisfied in wireless
networks than in the traditional Internet context:
• Wireless devices are often personal belongings of the respective user
and thus out of control for central system administration. This creates a
4
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Figure 1.2.: Wireless network without protection; an attacker has full access
to the wireless channel and can communicate with any device in
the vicinity.
large potential for misconfigurations, lazy security updates and infected
clients.
• Wireless clients are mobile, often dynamically changing back and forth
between trust boundaries. This usually results in more complex security
protocols.
• The fundamental broadcast characteristics of wireless networks make
them a perfect playground for all kinds of attacks. In contrast to wired
networks where physical control of traffic is inherently given, wireless
networks are open by nature.
Perhaps surprisingly, firewalls are entirely nonexistent in the wireless domain.
Yet, the need to selectively control and block radio communication is partic-
ularly high in a broadcast environment since any node may receive and send
packets.
The problem is, however, that in contrast to wired networks, the broadcast
nature of the wireless channel does not provide any physical separation of
the traffic and thus setting up a boundary between inside and outside world
is much harder to achieve, especially when considering mobile nodes. Conse-
quently, preventing a packet from being received cannot be based on simple
and silent dropping at a store-and-forward device but requires a different
mechanism. This is depicted in Figure 1.2.
This thesis sets out to explore a way to offer a security service similar to
that of firewalls in wired networks. We propose a distributed guardian system
5
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Figure 1.3.: Network with a remote protection. An additional system, the
wireless firewall, is added to control the communication on the
wireless channel. It monitors the channels and intercepts all pack-
ets that do not adhere to the policy, implementing access control
for the protected network.
to protect wireless networks based on physically regulating channel access
by means of selective interference. The guardians are deployed alongside a
sensor network, inspecting all local traffic, classifying packets based on their
content, and destroying any malicious packet while still on the air.
Bringing Firewalls to Wireless Networks
In our approach, we aim to protect wireless devices from attacks over-the-
air and on a per-packet basis, lifting the security burden from them. Our
approach combines selective interference and rule-based security policies to
a generic protection mechanism for wireless networks.
To that end, we explore the concept of wireless firewalls. The core idea is
simple and yet effective. The working principle is simple—if we cannot prevent
the transmission of a malicious packet, we may still prevent its reception. The
protection system listens to the wireless medium and attempts to demodulate
and decode ongoing transmissions. When a received signal matches any pre-
defined blocking rule, a jamming signal is sent by the system to interfere with
the ongoing frame transmission at the receiver.
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The wireless firewall achieves this by content-based classification and se-
lective interference that is just long enough to induce checksum errors in
malicious packets. This way, the protection is fully transparent to the net-
work: everything received without errors is trustworthy.
1.4. Contributions and Outline
The main goal of this thesis is to show that such remote protection is the-
oretically sound and technically feasible. We aim to explore the protection
properties of such systems, and the possibilities and limitations of the ap-
proach.
Because the protection system operates on the physical layer, it is essential
to perform an experimental evaluation together with system modeling and
analysis. The interaction of different systems on the physical layer is very hard
to capture correctly in communication models. For this reason, we first set out
to understand the effects of jamming and interference analytically to design
an optimal protection system. Subsequently, to validate the analytical results
and to show the technical feasibility, we also design and implement such a
remote protection system, called WiFire, and perform a series of experiments
that facilitates the understanding of remote protection using RF interference.
This thesis makes several contributions:
• We introduce the concept of remote protection using RF interference. In
contrast to existing solutions, it supports a selective filtering of packet
transmissions using a ruleset that is checked during the transmission
of the packet. Additionally, we focus to provide access control from
a distance, in the order of several meters, instead of approaches that
require a close proximity between all devices.
• To maximize the effects of RF interference and to provide reliable
protection, it is essential to understand the effects of collisions at the
physical layer to identify the reasons why packets are either lost or
received. In this thesis, we provide a comprehensive analysis of packet
collisions that uses the mathematical representation of RF signals and
a realistic receiver model to derive detailed reception conditions. These
insights help to ensure that the wireless firewall operates successfully,
but the results also offer new insights in the area of network performance
modeling and network protocols.
• Based on the realistic system model in the previous item, we analyze
the protection properties of wireless firewalls. Because the system op-
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erates on the physical layer, the nature of protection is different from
cryptographic protection, and this analysis yields the insight that the
relation of signal strengths at the receiver plays a decisive role. Our
results show that a remote protection is indeed feasible, but new factors
must be considered like the positions of all network participants.
• After we have shown that the protection concept is sound, we present
the design and implementation of WiFire, a prototype system for a
wireless firewall. We overcome several technical challenges in the design
of such systems, and are the first who provide a reactive and selective
jamming system for ieee .. networks. Using system benchmarks,
we show that all our design goals are met.
• In order to validate our experimental results for reception in collisions
and to understand the real-world effects of jamming, we provide a
comprehensive experimental evaluation of jamming, which considers
factors like interference duration, optimal jamming waveforms, and
difference receiver designs.
• Finally, we provide a real-world performance evaluation of WiFire, val-
idating that the wireless firewall concept is indeed feasible in practice.
The thesis outline is as follows. We first provide a discussion of related work.
While physical layer security is a very active area, we show that the use of
selective interference for access control is a novel concept. In the first part
of this thesis, we outline the concept and provide an analytical treatment
of the interference effects that we use for our system, such as collisions on
the wireless channel, and the protection properties of RF interference. In
the second part, we offer insights into the system design and implementation,
discussing the pros and cons of different architectural choices. In the last part,
we employ the system implementation to perform an experimental evaluation
of our concept. We show that our models that we developed in the analysis
are a good prediction for real-world behavior, and that the protection concept
of wireless firewalls is a suitable approach for wireless networks. Finally, we
provide a detailed discussion of further technical and non-technical aspects,
and conclusions on this work.
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To understand the research context of this work, we first review other
research contributions in the literature that consider security mechanisms on
the physical layer. Physical layer security is a new paradigm that is being
explored to protect wireless devices from attacks. The general idea is to shift
the protection from the upper layers to the physical layer of communications,
which opens up physical features like angle of arrival, the shape of a waveform,
the unpredictability of channel fading, or properties of noise and interference,
which all can be employed to protect devices. Two of these physical layer
approaches are closely related to the topic of this thesis, namely jamming for
confidentiality (i.e., adding interference on the wireless channel to prevent
the reception of outside eavesdroppers) and jamming for access control (i.e.,
interference is generated to prevent the reception of inside receivers).
2.1. Jamming for Confidentiality
In information theory the concept of secrecy capacity of broadcast channels
with noise was studied extensively, starting with Wyner’s work on wiretap
9
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channels (1975). The goal is to enable confidential communications without
secrets over a public broadcast channel. Recently, several authors augmented
the wiretap channel by considering the creation of intentional noise to boost
the secrecy capacity of the channel. This approach is known under various
designation, such as artificial noise (Goel and Negi, 2008; R. Liu et al.,
2008), cooperative jamming (X. He and Yener, 2009; Tekin and Yener,
2008), friendly jamming (Vilela et al., 2011), the relay-eavesdropper channel
(Lai and El Gamal, 2008), or the wiretap channel with helping interferer
(Tang et al., 2011). These works show that confidentiality in the sense of
information theory can be achieved even if the signal-to-noise-and-interference
ratio (SINR) of the adversary is higher. Our work is orthogonal to these
approaches because we exploit jamming to control medium access instead of
ensuring message confidentiality at the physical layer, i.e., while the jamming
in the related work is targeting attackers to prevent them to receive messages,
our approach here is to jam the nodes in the protected network, preventing
them from receiving unauthorized messages.
Work on wireless network security applies result on the wiretap channel
to prevent information leakage from a protected geographical area by hinder-
ing the reception process of eavesdroppers using intentional RF interference
in more realistic scenarios. Kim et al. (2012) propose defensive jamming,
a method to prevents eavesdroppers from detecting messages correctly by
using jamming directed towards the border of the protected area. The ba-
sic assumption of this approach is that the network deployment area itself
is physically secured, so that the eavesdropper must remain outside a sur-
rounding security perimeter. The authors perform an analysis of jammer
placement strategies based on the SINR model and show that eavesdropping
can be prevented successfully by an appropriate spatial jammer placement.
The work of Sankararaman et al. (2012) analyzes similar attack scenarios
and presents algorithms for optimal jamming power assignment and jammer
placement, both for a fixed number of jammers and a near-optimal number of
jammers. While the methods used on these works can be adapted to analyze
the performance and deployment of our wireless firewall system, this work
is orthogonal because they consider passive (eavesdropping) attackers, while
we focus on active (injecting) attackers.
Cooperative jamming from a third node is used to make decoding at eaves-
dropping nodes impossible (Lai and El Gamal, 2008). iJam (Gollakota
and Katabi, 2011) achieves the same purpose without a third node and for
OFDM signals.
Confidentiality of transmissions in these approaches relies on the fact that
an eavesdropper cannot overcome the effects of interference. However, if
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the interference pattern is known, it is possible to eliminate the interfering
waveform and recover the original signal (Halperin, Anderson, et al.,
2008). And even if the interference patterns is not known, it is possible for
the attacker to increase the degrees of freedom that the receiver has. For
example, Tippenhauer et al. (2013) showed that an attacker always has the
option to increase its number of antennas, allowing to isolate the defensive
jamming signal and to recover the confidential information. Our approach
does not suffer from these drawbacks, because we interfere with the reception
of an attacked device, whose capabilities are known to us, instead of interfering
with the reception of an eavesdropper, which can have arbitrarily advanced
capabilities.
2.2. Jamming for Access Control
The concept of using selective interference for access control has recently been
proposed in several application areas: to protect implanted medical devices
(IMDs) from malicious readers, to increase the privacy of RFID tags, and to
ensure authentic communication in WSNs. In contrast to these works, we
provide a system that allows configurable security policies based on packet
content and aims to provide a central protection over larger distances in a
networked setting, in contrast to a reader–single device setting. A summary
of the following comparison is provided in Table 2.1.
2.2.1. Wireless LAN
Wireless intrusion detection and prevention systems (WIPS) are also closely
related to the wireless firewall (Scarfone andMell, 2007, §5) in the context
of wireless LANs. They are primarily focus on detecting attacks and policy
violations in ieee . networks. However, commercial products for WLAN
protection such as AirMagnet by Fluke Corporation (2011), AirDefense
by Motorola Solutions (2011) or SpectraGuard by AirTight Net-
works (2011) do not prevent the reception of packets; rather, they exploit
the fact that communication is only possible after reaching an associated state
with an access point, and repeatedly break this association to the adversary.
These systems have only limited capability to deny access to unauthorized
nodes by sending spoofed disassociation and de-authentication frames to
rogue devices. This approach is not applicable to protect low-power wireless
networks because their protocols do not use such association mechanisms.
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Thus, in contrast to these higher-layer approaches, the wireless firewall must
operate on the physical layer to achieve its goal.
Our approach supports more sophisticated access blocking rules and does
not rely on valid frame semantics to deny access but uses physical-layer
jamming. Furthermore. our approach is immune to malicious nodes which
discard disassociation and de-authentication frames to remain connected.
2.2.2. Implanted Medical Devices
There are several works that consider securing IMDs to ensure the safety and
privacy of patients with IMDs. This is because the devices may otherwise
send out confidential information or even be reconfigured wirelessly against
the patients wishes (Fu, 2009; Halperin, Heydt-Benjamin, et al., 2008).
Heartbeats. IMDs face challenges similar to WSNs, namely low computa-
tional resources and limited energy. Gollakota, Hassanieh, et al. (2011)
describe an external IMD protection system, or IMD “shield,” that allows to
regulate access to the device using selective interference, protecting it from
malicious readers. The shield is a battery-powered device that is worn close
the implanted device (with a distance of less than 20 cm), e.g., in the form
of a pendant. It acts as a proxy that simultaneously receives and destroys
any packet related to the protected IMD. If the packet is going to the IMD,
the shield checks whether the reader is trusted and forwards the packet. If
the packet originated from the IMD, the packet is forwarded in encrypted
form to the querying reader to protect the patients’s privacy. A USRP2-based
prototype system is presented, showing that an attacker can only succeed if
it uses high transmit power and close proximity.
IMDGuard. Xu et al. (2011) also describe an external guardian system
that protects IMDs from untrusted readers. It supports an IMD during cryp-
tographic operations, and uses selective interference when an attacker tries
to disturb this operation. This system also works transparently, i.e., there is
no need to modify the IMD after it is implanted. However, in contrast to the
concept of the wireless firewall, the external guardian must be placed in close
proximity to the protected device, which constitutes a reader–device setting
instead of a networked setting with several devices that we are aiming for.
Additionally, they do not offer programmable security policies: IMDGuard
uses packet timing to detect malicious packets. However, the concept relies on
cryptographic protocols and uses the physical layer response only as a counter-
13
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measure to spoofing attacks. In contrast to these works, we offer configurable
policies for several devices in a distributed sensor network setting.
2.2.3. Radio Frequency Identification Tags
Radio frequency identification (RFID) tags are well known for their extreme
resource limitations and lack of reprogrammability. Several contributions
show that remote protection can be used in this context as well.
Blocker Tags. To protect the privacy of RFID tags from malicious readers,
Juels, Rivest, et al. (2003) introduce the “blocker tag” to prevent the tag
discovery by confusing readers with artificial collisions. The attacker queries
a prefix of node IDs (e.g., the first two bits), and on collisions the reader
refines the prefix, such that the blocker tag can force the reader to traverse
the full address space by generating intentional interference. In this case, the
reader assumes that several tags are present and that more specific queries
are required; but as the collisions are triggered for all queries, the reader is
forced to search the complete address space (e.g., 264 addresses). Juels and
Brainard (2004) extend this concept to signal privacy policies to benign
readers.
RFID Guardian. Rieback et al. (2005; 2007) offer a similar solution but
support the protection of configurable sets of RFIDs (blocker tags only
support address blocks). A battery-powered handheld device, the “RFID
Guardian,” monitors all queries and interferes with a tag’s response to hide
its presence from malicious readers. The system enables the use of config-
urable access control lists (ACLs) for arbitrary sets of RFID tags that specify
which readers are allowed to interact with which tags. Again, this is a reader–
device setting with small distances (up to 1m for RFID Guardian). However,
the main difference to our work is that these schemes do not operate on a
per-packet basis: malicious queries are actually received by the tag, and only
the tag’s response is blocked. This is not problematic because RFID tags
commonly do not keep state information. With our implementation, we can
prevent sensor motes from receiving any malicious packet, also protecting
their internal state. With the wireless firewall, we want to protect devices
starting with the very first packet.
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2.2.4. Wireless Sensor Networks
Jamming for Good. A closely related work protects sensor motes from
spoofed packets (based on RSSI information) using selective interference
(Martinovic, Gollan, et al., 2008;Martinovic, Pichota, and Schmitt,
2009). This work showed that injection attacks against WSNs can be mit-
igated in a cooperative manner by jamming packets with suspicious signal
fingerprints.
In these works, sensor devices support each other to prevent impersonation
attacks, i.e., an attacker pretending to be part of the network by spoofing its
source address to look like an existing network device. When a sensor device
wants to send data, it first sends a “reservation packet” to notify others of
its transmission wish before it starts sending the data packet. Sensor devices
in the vicinity compare the claimed source address and the physical signal
fingerprint of the reservation (which depends on the device’s location and is
hard to spoof) with previously observed measurements. In case of a mismatch
(i.e., a potential attack), the device schedules a concurrent transmission with
the data packet, intercepting the spoofed packet. This approach explores
the concept of over-the-air support to increase security, but also forces an
expensive mode of operation on the network.
Because standard sensor motes are considered in their experiments, a spe-
cial admission frame prior to the actual data frames is necessary to relax
the timing constraints in order to decouple the jamming decision from the
actual jamming process The protection is performed by the network motes
themselves, analyzing if the RSSI signature of the registration packet matches
with the claimed source address, and scheduling the transmission of an inter-
fering packet concurrent with the data packet in case of a mismatch. However,
the requirement that motes must receive packets that are not addressed to
them and send packets for interference is expensive in terms of energy. So,
while the goals are similar, the approach is different. We explore the use of
specially designed wireless firewall devices that provide a per-packet central
enforcement of access policies, without requiring a custom MAC protocol.
The wireless firewall explores the use of a dedicated security infrastructure
to protect wireless devices in a fully transparent way: no modifications are
required, the devices do not even need to know that WiFire is protecting
them.
Home jamming. Brown et al. (2013) present a jamming system that
protects a home network from injection attacks in the spirit of Jamming for
Good introduced above. The authors present a dedicated device that focuses
15
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on the MAC protocol of the ZigBee standard, which is prevalent in the context
of home automation.
2.2.5. Other Applications
In the military context, the U.S. military employs mobile jamming systems
to protect convoys in Iraq from improvised roadside bombs, stopping a bomb
trigger signal from arriving at the bomb’s receiver (LaShomb, 2006).1 How-
ever, not much is known about the system’s implementation and operation.
2.3. Summary
The application of physical layer security has seen a steady increase of research
contributions that explore the feasibility and fitness of this approach. We have
seen that while the wireless firewall concept builds on a strong foundation
of recent results, there are a great number of research questions that are
introduced by the fact that the wireless firewall protects from a distance,
rather than from a close proximity.
1A news article on IED jammers used in the Iraq campaign is available at http://
edition.cnn.com/2007/TECH/08/13/cied.jamming.tech
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The purpose of this chapter is to provide a bird’s eye view on the operation
of wireless firewalls. At the same time, this is the right place to discuss some
basic architectural alternatives to such protection systems and provide the
rationale for top-level design decisions we have taken.
3.1. Protection Scenario
We consider a wireless sensor network scenario with three types of devices:
1. Wireless sensor nodes that perform a distributed sensing application;
these nodes are the target of attacks and hence are referred to as victim
nodes v.
2. Attacker nodes a that attempt to send malicious packets to victim
nodes v to disrupt their intended network operation.
Legend
Attacker
Guardian
Sensor mote
dav
dgv
dag
Figure 3.1.: Sensor network deployment with co-located guardian nodes.
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3. Guardian nodes g that want to prevent victim nodes v from receiving
malicious packets from attackers a.
The guardian uses a limited pulse of interference to protect the devices in
the vicinity. Of special interest in this problem setting is the spatial aspect.
We assume that the attacker cannot move arbitrarily close to the protected
devices.
3.2. Using Interference for Access Control
To contrast the novel approach required for a wireless firewall to the standard
(packet filter) firewall, we discuss the mode of operation of these conventional
devices. The standard firewall basically has to execute the following three
steps:
Step 1: Receive and store a packet.
Step 2: Classify the packet into trusted or untrusted.
Step 3: If trusted forward the packet, else block it.
A fundamental assumption thus is that firewalls are store-and-forward devices.
In our approach we deviate from this assumption and essentially implement
the wireless firewall as a cut-through device altering the three basic steps
into:
Step 1’: Analyze the signal stream.
We need to operate on the physical layer instead of the network layer
since otherwise a transmission is over before we even had the chance
to detect a policy violation.
Step 2’: Detect untrusted signal features.
The detection of policy violations literally has to be done on the fly.
Step 3’: If untrusted feature detected, interfere.
We are not in the forwarding path of the wireless traffic, so in order to
virtually block certain packets we interfere with the reception.
Packets are destroyed in Step 3’ by triggering the packet checksum mechanism
of ieee ... Since the CRC of packets at victim nodes is erroneous when
at least one symbol is wrong, packets that are hit strong enough by interference
from a guardian node are discarded by the victim receivers.
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Thus, the wireless firewall proceeds in three steps in its operation: (i)
spotting packets, (ii) distinguishing friends from foes, and (iii) destroying
malicious packets. We will discuss each step in more detail.
Detecting packets
The system continuously monitors the wireless medium, spotting packets for
analysis. It exploits the fact that an attacker must be constructive to inject
packets, it must comply to the correct frame format to ensure that its packets
have a chance to be received. In this sense, the system scans the medium
for the physical layer header of ieee .., consisting of a preamble and
start-of-frame delimiter (SFD).
Jamming decision
In order to form a correct decision, it is necessary to have as much access
to the packet content as possible. Based on this information, a set of rules
defines packets that are deemed malicious. Similar to standard firewalls, it is
also conceivable to block all traffic that does not match any of the rules.
Preventing packet reception
We propose to prevent packet receptions by controlled interference. The in-
tended receiver then either misses the packet completely or detects a corrupted
frame with a failed integrity check. This approach to prevent receptions gives
the wireless firewall a transparency property: protected devices do not need
to know about the wireless firewall presence, no protocol adaptations or con-
trol messages from the firewall are necessary. Therefore, the system can be
added to existing legacy networks to patch their security problems, filtering
out malicious packets. During normal operation, the system monitors the
channel passively and reacts to immediate threats only.
Benefits of the Jamming Approach
In a standard firewall blocking comes for free: just discard untrusted packets
silently. The wireless firewall has to become active when we discover a policy
violation: we jam an untrusted packet such that it cannot be received properly
at a protected node. In a certain sense jamming can be seen as a physical layer
warning from the firewall to a node within its network. This may motivate the
idea that we could provide for such a warning also on higher layers, effectively
relieving us from the burden to jam a “passing by” packet in real-time. In fact,
21
3. Protection Concept
some of the commercial wireless intrusion detection systems (e.g., AirDefense)
use ieee . deauth messages in an attempt to set stations associated
to a rogue access point free again. Nevertheless, we opted for jamming as a
blocking primitive for the following reasons:
• Jamming does not carry any semantics; higher layer warnings require
interpretation by the receiving node, as such they are prone to new
attacks exploiting this interpretation.
• Jamming is idempotent, attacks against jamming equal jamming itself;
this results in the fact that any persistent attack is reduced to a denial
of communication in the protected wireless network, effectively locking
it up, which is the typical response of a firewall if its protected network
is under heavy attack.
• Jamming protects many receivers at the same time; this is owing to
the fact that the jamming signal is inherently broadcast.
• Jamming allows for a transparent protection; what is received correctly
can be trusted immediately without requiring to wait for a possible
warning, which could complicate protocol processing at end systems
and would result in a loss of firewall transparency.
3.3. Research Challenges
In this thesis, we set out to answer the following research questions to develop
a wireless firewall:
• Understanding packet receptions: We want to identify the factors
that govern packet reception.
• Optimal jamming:What methods can be used to ensure that a packet
is indeed dropped?
• Nature of protection: Under what circumstances does such a pro-
tection on the physical layer work? In particular, what kind of attacks
can be prevented?
3.3.1. Understanding Packet Reception
To build an effective wireless firewall, it is important to understand the
reception process at the receiver, and especially to identify conditions that
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ensure that a malicious packet is destroyed. For this reason, we first set
out to identify these conditions analytically. This challenge is addressed in
Chapter 4.
3.3.2. Optimal Jamming Techniques
Using the insights from the reception process analysis, another important
aspect relates to the choice of the interference waveform and interference pat-
terns. It is well known that certain waveforms are more effective at causing
bit errors than others (Poisel, 2011). The effectiveness of the interference
waveform depends on the particular modulation scheme and the design of the
receiver. Advantageously, wireless sensor nodes are generally not designed
to suppress in-band interference well. They only low-pass filter the base-
band signal and send the output directly to the demodulator (DeBruhl
and Tague, 2011). We see in our experimental evaluation in Section 8.2.3
that a continuous sine wave, a waveform that is generally known as being
ineffective, happens to destroy packets even more effectively in ieee ..
with the same power budget than band-limited white noise or modulated
signals. Using a very narrowband waveform like this provides the advantage
that other technologies like WLAN are able to efficiently suppress this kind
of interference (Karhima et al., 2004) and hence remain unaffected by the
guardians.
3.3.3. Nature of Protection
When considering the security protocols that employ cryptographic primitives,
the necessary conditions for provable security are readily stated. For example,
given that a secret key is not leaked to an adversary, the confidentiality of an
encrypted link can be established in a straightforward way. This modularity
enables the definition of more complex protocols from cryptographic building
blocks, which can still be analyzed for their security.
In contrast, a protection at the physical layer often does not support a state-
ment that a protocol is secure under any conceivable circumstance. Rather
than fully preventing an attack, the difficulty to perform an attack is in-
creased by a physical layer security scheme, and the goal is to raise the costs
of an attack to regions that negates any benefit the attacker might have from
its attack. For example, when applying spread spectrum to a protected radio
signal in order to make it more robust against interference, the attack power
that is necessary to destroy the communication is increased by a certain
factor (e.g., by a factor of 100 or 1,000), but a strong or close attacker can
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still succeed. In this sense, the goal of a protection on the physical layer is to
reduce the risks of using wireless connectivity, but not to guarantee that no
attack is possible. To better understand wireless firewalls, we make the effort
to find a suitable metric to analyze the protection that a wireless firewall
offers. We evaluate this protection against two generic attackers a stealthy
attacker that hides from detection of the wireless firewall, and a brute force
attacker that negates the protection by overcoming the effects of RF inter-
ference. For these attackers, we analyze how the risk of a successful attack is
reduced.
3.4. Technical Challenges
Clearly, jamming must be used with care, which brings about a list of desirable,
but challenging attributes that must be solved technically:
• Reactive/Selective: the wireless firewall needs to reactively jam de-
pending on whether policy violations are detected in the signal stream.
Consequently, it only jams a subset of the overall packet stream selec-
tively.
• Efficient: The jamming duration shall be kept minimal in order to
keep interference with concurrent legitimate transmissions low.
• Effective: We need to jam successfully with high probability (i.e., detect
all and jam all packets).
On the other hand, this mode of “friendly jamming” can also support us to
make the task of successful jamming easier. In fact, the devices protected by
the wireless firewall want to be jammed. This brings us into a convenient
position compared to an adversarial jammer, because we can assume to have
access to knowledge, e.g., secret hopping frequencies. Thus anti-jamming
measures like spread-spectrum modulation or even recent interference can-
cellation techniques (Halperin, Anderson, et al., 2008) become no issue.
Furthermore, we can control the placement, the sending power, and the an-
tenna configurations of the wireless firewall to plan for an effective jamming.
And last but not least, we can employ several instances to make it very hard
for an attacker to circumvent its transmission to be jammed by the protection
system.
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PHY packet
tpacket ≈ 350 µs
tdetect tinit tjam
Figure 3.2.: Time constraints of ieee ..: the reactive jammer must
detect a transmission, initiate the jamming process and interfere
with the transmission to prevent a packet reception.
3.4.1. Reactive and Selective Operation
We set ambitious goals for our wireless firewall system: an accurate detection
of RF transmissions as well as reliable and precise jamming, all while a packet
is still on the air.
Policy enforcement
The system must enable the definition of central policies and must be able
to enforce them. The wireless firewall must take responsibility from the
end-points and manage it centrally. We want a central point of control and
configuration to prevent the reception of transmissions that do not comply
with the specified policy. The system must provide a complete enforcement
of the defined policy, in particular, it must detect and prevent all policy
violations. Transmissions that comply with the policy must be received by
the destinations. Due to the broadcast nature of the wireless channel, this
shows the major departure that the system must take from the wired firewall
analogy: all transmissions that are not actively blocked reach their destination.
Timing challenges
In order to achieve all three steps of operation that the wireless firewall per-
forms per packet, the system must be fast. To get an impression of the timing
requirements, refer to Figure 3.2. The system must detect a transmission and
decide whether it must be jammed or not (with the required time tdetect),
schedule and initialize the sending of a jamming signal (with delay tinit),
and send a short, yet sufficient jamming burst to destroy the packet (tjam),
25
3. Protection Concept
all while it is being transmitted.1 The concurrent jamming must exceed the
shortest interference time tminjam to cause a packet loss. Therefore, we require
tdetect + tinit + t
min
jam ≤ tpacket,
i.e., to react quickly enough to hit the packet for the minimal required jamming
duration. In the case of ieee .., the shortest packets are ACKs, with
a duration of tpacket = 352 µs. This strict deadline means that the system
design must support real-time operation to perform all three steps for each
packet individually, before it can arrive at the receiver.
3.4.2. Efficient Operation
The drawback using controlled interference is that we introduce more inter-
ference than necessary, which could be problematic for the operation of the
sensor network or other wireless networks in the same frequency band. One
system design goal for the wireless firewall is therefore to make this interfer-
ence as “friendly” as possible by using very short periods of interference and
using waveforms that are effective at the target sensor nodes but negligibly
disturbing for other wireless networking technologies operating in the vicinity.
We expect the wireless firewall to be friendly to co-existing networks. This is
important because an unintentional derogation of co-existing networks could
prevent a certification of guardian devices or reduce the acceptance of their
deployments; we discuss legal issues at the end of this thesis. We show that,
by using jamming waveforms that are efficient against one technology but
have only limited effect of other technologies, that this can be achieved.
Reflections on Guardian Interference
To achieve “friendly” interference, the duration of the blocking signals should
be as short as possible. In ieee .., one erroneous symbol already
leads to a wrong CRC checksum, and the packet at the victim node is dis-
carded. Hence, a guardian who detects an unauthorized packet ideally needs
to interfere with that packet for the duration of a single symbol (16 µs).
We investigate in Section 8.2.3 that, under real-world settings, it requires a
slightly higher duration of selective guardian interference to effectively block
all undesired packets. However, this short interference period is still limited
and negligible compared to the signal duration of the packet emitted by the
1We do not consider the propagation delay in our analysis, we assume short distances
between all devices.
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attacker. A wireless sensor network will hence not be significantly impacted
since ieee .. nodes perform carrier sensing and should not transmit
concurrently with the attacker anyway.
3.4.3. Effective Operation
To be effective the guardians should reliably detect all packets on the air and
interfere with all unauthorized ones. At the same time, the interference should
be limited in order to minimize possible effects on concurrent communications
on the same frequency band. This poses a quite different problem compared
to proactive jamming performance evaluations in the literature Bayrak-
taroglu et al. (2008) and Law et al. (2009). The reactive jammer must
be able to destroy transmissions at the receiver even if a sender has already
started a transmission. We analyze the causes of loss on the physical layer and
identify the jamming signal that causes the minimal packet reception ratio
(PRR). We evaluate the minimal jam duration and show that the required
jamming burst can be as short as tminjam = 26 µs to ensure a PRR of 0%.
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4.1. Introduction
In this chapter, we aim identify the reasons for packet loss at the receiver
caused by collisions on the physical layer. For this purpose we develop a
detailed model of the physical layer of ieee .., in line with our goal
to develop a system for WSN protection. The motivation for this approach
is twofold. First, with this knowledge, we can identify the conditions for
loss and use this knowledge to accurately model the protection offered by
wireless firewalls, as well as finding the most efficient approach for jamming.
For this reason, we start out with a model that is as general as possible,
with a large number of parameters. The goal is to identify parameters that
matter most, and use this knowledge to develop a simplified model to analyze
the protection properties of wireless firewalls in the next chapter. Second,
identifying the reasons for packet loss in collisions is also of general interest
in wireless network research because of a novel avenue of research where
interference is controlled instead of avoided. This perception shift led to the
exploitation of concurrent transmissions.
4.1.1. The Case of Concurrent Transmissions
Conventional wireless communication systems consider packet collisions as
problematic and try to avoid them by using techniques like carrier sense,
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channel reservations (virtual carrier sense, RTS/CTS handshakes), or arbi-
trated medium access (TDMA, polling). The intuition is that concurrent
transmissions cause irreparable bit errors at the receiver and render packet
transmissions undecodable. However, researchers have found that this notion
is too conservative. If the power of the signal of interest exceeds the sum of
interference from colliding packets by a certain threshold, packets can in gen-
eral still be received successfully despite collisions at the receiver. This effect,
referred to as the capture effect (Leentvaar and Flint, 1976), has been
explored extensively and validated in many independent practical studies
on various communication systems such as ieee . (Foo and Huang,
2008; Gummadi et al., 2007; Kochut et al., 2004; J. Lee et al., 2007) and
ieee .. (Gezer et al., 2010; Maheshwari et al., 2008; Son et al.,
2006).
Over the past years, the view on packet collisions has therefore changed
considerably. Since it is possible for some or even all packets in a collision
to survive, there are opportunities to increase the overall channel utilization
and to improve the network throughput by designing protocols that carefully
select terminals for transmitting at the same time (Sha et al., 2009; Vu-
tukuru et al., 2008). The benefits and potential performance improvements
of concurrent transmission are not just of theoretical interest but have been
demonstrated practically and adopted in application areas such as any-cast
(Dutta, Dawson-Haggerty, et al., 2010; Dutta, Musăloiu-E., et al.,
2008), neighbor counting D. Wu et al. (2014), or rapid network flooding
(Doddavenkatappa et al., 2013; Ferrari et al., 2011; Lu and White-
house, 2009; Wang, Y. He, et al., 2012; Wang, Y. Liu, et al., 2014),
especially in the context of wireless sensor networks (WSNs).
Although protocols that exploit concurrent transmissions have shown the
potential to boost the overall performance of existing wireless communication
systems, their success cannot be explained with capture threshold models
based on the Signal to Interference and Noise Ratio (SINR) alone. Recent
studies have shown that, while the relative signal powers of colliding packets
indeed play an important role in the reception probability, other factors are
also of major importance. For example, several experimental studies report
that the relative timing between colliding packets has a significant influence
on the reception probability (J. Lee et al., 2007; Santhapuri et al., 2008).
Others report that the coding (Davis and Gronemeyer, 1980) or packet
content (Dutta, Dawson-Haggerty, et al., 2010) may also greatly influ-
ence the reception performance in the presence of collisions. Further factors
such as the carrier phase offset between a packet of interest and colliding
packets also need to be considered (Pöpper et al., 2011).
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4.1.2. Modeling Approach
In this chapter, we strive to provide a comprehensive model accounting for all
these factors, focusing on packet collisions in ieee .. basedWSNs. Such
a model will allow protocol designers to better understand the root causes
of packet reception and exact conditions under which concurrent transmis-
sions actually work, and thus to design optimal protocols based on these
factors. While previous studies (Gummadi et al., 2007; Maheshwari et al.,
2008; Whitehouse et al., 2005; Yuan and Hollick, 2013; Zimmerling
et al., 2013) also looked at factors that determine the success of concurrent
packet reception, these works are either based on practical experiments and
have therefore led to empirical models that cannot be generalized easily, or
derived simplified models that do not account for all impact factors. This
work advances the field by providing a unified analytical model accounting for
the major factors identified above (see also Section 4.2). Our model (→ Sec-
tion 4.4) is based on a mathematical representation of the physical layer using
continuous-time expressions of the IQ signals entering the receiver’s radio
interface. This fundamental and comprehensive model allows to represent an
arbitrary number of colliding packets as a linear superposition of the incoming
signals.
A major contribution of this chapter is a closed-form analytical representa-
tion of the bit decision variable at an optimal receiver’s demodulator output
based on these IQ signals (→ Section 4.5). This result enables the determin-
istic computation of the bit demodulation decision and hence to compute the
actual performance of concurrent transmissions for any colliding parameter
constellations. Having a bit-level model of reception is not only beneficial
for the comprehension of the collision process, it also contributes to applica-
tion areas where a precise bit-level analysis is needed, such as partial packet
reception (Jamieson and Balakrishnan, 2007), understanding bit error
patterns in low-power wireless networks (Hermans et al., 2014; Schmidt
et al., 2013; K. Wu et al., 2012), understanding the network performance
in heavily used spectrum conditions Zhao and Govindan (2003), or signal
manipulation attacks at the physical layer (Pöpper et al., 2011).
Using our model, we explore the parameter space of the reception of MSK-
modulated colliding packets considering both uncoded and Direct Sequence
Spread Spectrum (DSSS) based systems (→ Section 4.6), analyzing the in-
fluence of the parameters on the resulting packet reception ratio (PRR) for
concurrent transmissions. While the analysis shows that our model agrees
with experimental results in the literature, it also provides much more de-
tailed insights into the performance characteristics of protocols that exploit
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collisions (Doddavenkatappa et al., 2013; Dutta, Dawson-Haggerty,
et al., 2010; Ferrari et al., 2011; Lu and Whitehouse, 2009; Wang,
Y. He, et al., 2012; Wang, Y. Liu, et al., 2014). In particular, we show
that the good performance of these protocols should be attributed equally to
coding (e.g., DSSS) and power capture. In addition, based on our analysis
we identified parameter constellations where concurrent transmissions work
reliably. We therefore propose a generalization of the traditional capture
threshold model based on the power ratios towards a capture zone. Capture
zones result from the model insight that reception success does not depend on
the power ratio between interfering signals alone, but on the time and phase
offsets of sender and receiver as well. We discuss parameter settings for an
optimal protocol design (→ Section 4.7). Finally, we perform an experimental
evaluation (Section 8.1) using the system we develop in the next chapters.
4.2. Parameters of the Analysis
Different factors influence the probability of a successful reception under
collisions. This section discusses the main factors that have been identified
in the literature. Subsequently, we consider them jointly in our mathematical
model to predict the outcome of concurrent transmissions.
Signal Power Ratio
The signal power is a crucial factor for successful reception in general, and
it plays a major role in the reception under collisions as well. SINR-based
models are widely used to model the packet reception in a shared medium, for
example in the Physical Model (Gupta and Kumar, 2000) and its variants
(Cardieri, 2010; Maheshwari et al., 2008). The classical SINR model
states that a stronger signal is received if its signal power Ps exceeds the
channel noise Pn and the sum of interfering signal powers
∑
i Pi by a given
threshold, i.e.,
Ps
Pn +
∑
i Pi
> δSINR.
This simple model is accurate for uncorrelated interfering signals such as
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). However, when the interference is
correlated (such as colliding packets), this model is not always accurate and
further factors must be considered (Gummadi et al., 2007; J. Lee et al.,
2007; Santhapuri et al., 2008).
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Signal Timing Offsets
The relative timing of colliding packets greatly influences the reception pro-
cess. This is because the receiver locks onto a packet during the synchroniza-
tion phase at the start of the transmission. If a stronger signal arrives later, it
captures the receiver and disturbs the first packet reception, and both packets
in the collision are lost. Thus, in packet radios, power capture alone is not
sufficient for successful reception, rather the receiver must be synchronized
and locked onto the captured signal as well. Several research contributions
analyze possible collision constellations and their effect on packet reception
(J. Lee et al., 2007; Santhapuri et al., 2008), and propose a new receiver
design that releases the lock when a stronger packet arrives, discards the first
and receives the second packet, the so-called message-in-message (MIM) cap-
ture (J. Lee et al., 2007; Whitehouse et al., 2005). Subsequent works apply
these insights to improve network throughput. For example, Manweiler
et al. (2012) propose collision scheduling to ensure that MIM is leveraged,
thus increasing spatial reuse.
Channel Coding
A further factor that influences packet reception success is bit-level coding. For
example, in DSSS systems a group of b bits is encoded into a longer sequence
of B chips (Proakis and Salehi, 2007). The benefit of this approach is that
resilience to interference is increased because the chipping sequences can be
cross-correlated at the receiver, which effectively filters out uncoded noise.
However, DSSS systems require interfering signals to be uncorrelated, e.g.,
signals without coding or with orthogonal chipping sequences (as in CDMA),
to achieve their theoretical coding gain. Another possibility is a sufficient time
offset between interfering packets with the same coding; this phenomenon is
known as delay capture (Davis and Gronemeyer, 1980). As networking
standards such as ieee . and ieee .. generally use DSSS with
identical codes for all participants, existing experimental works on collisions
and capture observe the effects of DSSS implicitly.
Packet Contents
Experimental results show that packets with identical payload and aligned
starting times result in good reception performance and reduced latency
in broadcast scenarios. For example, Dutta, Dawson-Haggerty, et al.
(2010) show that short packets can be received in such collisions with a
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PRR over 90%, thus enabling the design of an efficient receiver-initiated link
layer. Similarly, the latency of flooding protocols widely used in WSNs can
be greatly reduced (Ferrari et al., 2011; Wang, Y. He, et al., 2012). In
these works, experiments in ieee .. networks reveal that the tolerable
time offset between concurrent messages is small (approx. 500 ns), which adds
challenges to protocol design and implementation. These insights also show
that capture and packet synchronization alone are not sufficient to explain
the performance of these protocols, and bit-level modeling that also includes
signal timing and content is necessary.
Carrier Phase Offsets
Considering the reception of bits at the physical layer, knowledge of the
carrier phase at the receiver is crucial for successful reception of phase modu-
lated signals because the information is carried in the phase variations of the
signal, such that these offsets should be minimized (Proakis and Salehi,
2007). Typically this is achieved during the synchronization phase of packet
reception, and thus existing capture models have omitted phase offsets. How-
ever, there are two reasons why this is not sufficient. First, in novel protocols
exploiting packet collisions, the synchronization during the preamble is not
always able to succeed. Second, there are other new applications of concur-
rent transmissions that try to abandon the synchronization procedure. For
example, Pöpper et al. (2011) investigate the possibility of manipulating
individual message bits on the physical layer, and conclude that carrier phase
offsets are the major hindrance to do so reliably. The sensor nodes communi-
cate using ieee .. on the 2.4GHz band and we assume that all nodes
send and receive on the same channel. We further assume that the victim
sensor nodes v act in compliance to the ieee .. standard and that
they discard received packets for which the CRC checksum is incorrect. The
CRC checksum is a 16 bit field calculated over a packet’s payload and headers.
The CRC checksum is erroneous when a packet has at least one symbol error
(we do not consider error coding mechanisms such as the concept of Liang
et al. (2010)). We further assume that the victim nodes communicate without
header encryption, the wireless firewall can therefore eavesdrop and decode
any transmitted packets. This is no limitation of our concept for two reasons:
First, header encryption is generally not used in wireless networks because
all messages must be received, decrypted, and checked for integrity using all
available link keys, which is extremely inefficient; the ieee .. standard
(2006, §5.5.6) only considers data confidentiality as a security service. Second,
even if header encryption is used the wireless firewall can be given access to
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Figure 4.1.: The structure of ieee .. frames.
the network’s cryptographic material because they are part of the network
infrastructure. Then a guardian can decrypt packets during transmission
(there are efficient FPGA implementations of AES available (Hodjat and
Verbauwhede, 2004)).
4.3. Background on IEEE 802.15.4
Before going into details, we briefly cover aspects of the ieee .. physi-
cal layer that are necessary for the later discussion of jamming against such
networks. Although ieee .. (2006) defines four different physical lay-
ers for the wireless interconnection of devices in wireless personal area net-
works (WPANs), we limit ourselves here to the 2.4 GHz PHY because of its
widespread use. The standard defines 16 channels labeled Channel 11–26,
with a bandwidth of 2 MHz each and a 5 MHz interspacing. Bytes in the
PHY protocol data unit (PPDU) are transmitted at a rate of 250 kbps. They
are divided into groups of 4 bit, which are then mapped to a set of 16 sym-
bols. These symbols are spread with the corresponding 32 bit pseudo-noise
(PN) chipping sequence, i.e., ieee .. uses direct sequence spread spec-
trum (DSSS) with a spreading factor of eight. This stream of chips is then
modulated onto the carrier using O-QPSK with half-sine pulse-shaping, and
transmitted over the wireless medium to the receiver.
4.3.1. Reception Process
The reception process can be explained in terms of the PPDU headers (SHR
and PHR), shown in Figure 4.1. The essential components are shown in more
detail, and ellipses show the required reception steps for these components.
When a carrier is detected, the receiver synchronizes with the predefined
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preamble sequence (eight “0” symbols in the standard) to compensate the
phase and frequency offset of the incoming transmission. This is necessary
as the sender and receiver are not synchronized; with this step, the receiver
recovers the timing of both chips and symbols, and the symbol clock adjusts
to the symbol boundaries. The receiver then expects a specific two symbol
sequence, the Start-of-Frame Delimiter (SFD) that marks the beginning of the
PHY header (PHR) and the following MAC layer frame. This process is called
frame synchronization. The PHR consists of 7 bit containing the length of the
following PHY service data unit (PSDU), which allows for duration estimation
of the transmission. At each symbol clock tick, a decision is made as to which
of the 16 possible symbols was the one most likely transmitted during the last
period. At the end of the PSDU, the MAC footer (MFR) contains a 16 bit
integrity checksum (frame check sequence, FCS) using CRC16 that verifies
whether the frame is received without errors. If this is the case, the received
frame is passed to the higher layers. We refer the reader to (Oh and S.-G.
Lee, 2005; Schmid, 2006) for a more detailed treatment of the ieee ..
PHY and the properties of different transceiver designs.
4.3.2. Causes of Loss on the IEEE 802.15.4 PHY
To understand the underlying reasons for the effectiveness of different jam-
ming approaches, we need to identify the causes of packet loss on the ieee ..
physical layer. For a study focused on the ieee . physical layer, refer
to the work of Gummadi et al. (2007).
Symbol Misdetection and Integrity Errors
Once a frame is detected, the most likely symbol that has recently been trans-
mitted is chosen on each symbol clock tick. Strong jamming transmissions
concurrently with a symbol cause a symbol misdetection if a sufficient number
of chips are flipped, consequently generating bit errors on higher layers. In-
tegrity checks such as the CRC16 check of ieee .. detect these errors,
resulting in a packet drop as no forward error correction (FEC) is used in
ieee ... Thus, a single symbol error is sufficient to destroy a complete
packet. Similarly, the MHR contains addressing information and the frame
type, which can trigger packet drops if damaged even before the integrity of
the frame is checked.
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Failed Timing Recovery
If a jammer interferes with the preamble at the beginning of the transmission,
it can cause the timing recovery to fail. A corrected phase and frequency offset
are crucial for a successful packet reception, as otherwise symbol decisions
are based on sub-optimal (non-peak) sampling times that decrease the SNR
dramatically. This makes the symbol decisions more prone to errors, even if
the jammer interfered during the preamble only. Additionally, a failure to lock
onto a transmission can also cause the frame synchronization (discovering the
SFD) to fail, such that a packet is overheard completely even if the incoming
signal is strong.
Frame Synchronization and Damaged PHY Headers
With this strategy, a jammer interferes with the SFD or PSDU length field.
After the SFD is detected, the receiver knows that a frame is arriving and
starts to interpret a number of incoming symbols determined by the frame
length. A proactive jammer can insert SFDs on the channel to trigger frame
detection events at a receiver. The receiver then fails to detect any further
transmission for a period of time as it is already occupied with decoding
channel noise. In addition, a reactive jammer is able to selectively block the
SFD symbols such that a receiver does not detect a frame, or to introduce
an error in the frame length field that also results in a misinterpretation of
the frame’s fields.
Limited Dynamic Range
Common commercial receiver designs use mechanisms that make receivers
more robust in regular situations, but have a jamming amplification effect,
such as Automatic Gain Control (AGC). AGC is a control loop that adjusts
the amplification of incoming baseband signals to fill the complete dynamic
range of the analog-to-digital converter (ADC). This enables transceiver de-
signers to use cheap ADCs with low resolution, such as 4–6 bit (Oh and S.-G.
Lee, 2005). However, on the downside, an adversary can exploit the AGC
mechanism in two ways: either through a pre-emptive locking of the receiver
to low amplification, which makes other signals too weak to receive (causing
failed timing recovery or frame synchronization), or by reactively sending a
strong jamming signal to the receiver that uses a high gain setting (causing
clipping in the ADC and therefore symbol misdetection). Interestingly, both
of these strategies affect following symbols after the jamming has ceased, as
the control loop does not react instantaneously.
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Figure 4.2.: System model, its parameters are shown in ovals (information
bits αk, βk, carrier phase offset ϕc, time offset τ , signal amplitudes
As, Au). We consider one synchronized sender and n interferers
on a collision channel that is the input to a receiver. Here, three
channel coding schemes are considered, (i) uncoded, (ii) DSSS
with hard decision decoding (HDD), and (iii) DSSS with soft
decision decoding (SDD); resulting in different receiver paths.
4.4. System Model
In this section, we discuss the system model underlying our analysis, as
shown in Figure 4.2. It considers all factors from the previous section. From a
bird’s eye view, the model consists of three components: (i) the sender model
that modulates the physical layer signals of n + 1 transmitters, one fully
synchronized signal of interest (SoI) and n interferers with possibly differing
transmission starting times and payloads; (ii) the channel model with all
senders sharing a single collision channel that outputs a scaled superposition
of all signals (according to their corresponding power at the receiver), and
(iii) the receiver model with three detection methods: uncoded, DSSS with
hard decision decoding (HDD), and DSSS with soft decision decoding (SDD).
In the following, we discuss each component in detail.
4.4.1. Sender Model
In the first component, we modulate the physical signals of n+ 1 senders. We
instantiate our model with the Minimum Shift Keying (MSK) modulation,
a widely used digital modulation with desirable properties, and of special
interest because of its use in the 2.4GHz PHY of IEEE 802.15.4 (2006,
Sec. 6.5), but we also discuss other modulation schemes including O-QPSK,
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QPSK, and BPSK. For the signal representations, we follow the notation of
Proakis and Salehi (2007, Sec. 4.3).
Synchronized Sender
We assume that the receiver is fully synchronized to the SoI, i.e., the synchro-
nization process has successfully acquired this signal and all interferers have
relative offsets to it. The signal is then given by
s (t) = aI (t) cos
(
pit
2T
)
cosωct+ aQ (t) sin
(
pit
2T
)
sinωct. (4.1)
The signal consists of two components, the in- (I) and the quadrature-phase
(Q) components. Modulated onto each component are the information signals
(carrying the bits represented by αIk, α
Q
k ∈ {±1}) given by
aI (t) =
∞∑
k=−∞
αIkΠ
(
t− 2kT
2T
)
(4.2)
aQ (t) =
∞∑
k=−∞
αQk Π
(
t− (2k + 1)T
2T
)
, (4.3)
which represents a train of unit pulses Π with duration 2T , the bit duration
of the modulation (e.g., 2T = 1µs in ieee ..). The unit pulses are
defined by
Π (t) =

0 if |t| > 1
2
1
2
if |t| = 1
2
1 if |t| < 1
2
(4.4)
The information signals are staggered, i.e., the Q-phase information signal is
delayed by T in aQ (t). These signals are then shaped with half-sine pulses of
duration 2T , and modulated onto a carrier with frequency ωc/2pi (e.g., 2.4–
2.48GHz in ieee ..). In the following, we use the angular frequency
of baseband pulses ωp = pi/2T , such that the first cosine term in (4.1) may
be represented by cosωpt.
A graphical illustration of such an MSK-modulated signal is shown in
Figure 4.3. The modulated bit sequence is 1110010011; quadrature-phase bits
are underlined, the bits are thus distributed to both phases alternately. This
multiplexing to the IQ components is shown in the figure as blue, rectangular
pulse trains, where each pulse has a duration of 2T . In the first modulation
step, these rectangular pulses are shaped with half-sines, resulting in the the
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Figure 4.3.: Minimum shift keying (MSK) modulation example.
red sinusoids with ◦ markers in Figure 4.3. In the final step, the waveform is
modulated on a carrier, resulting in the green waveform (with 4 markers).
Both modulated IQ signals are added to result in the (real-valued) passband
time signal in the bottom figure. The figure also shows the properties that the
the quadrature component is delayed; we observe an additional staggering of
T .
(Unsynchronized) Interferers
In addition to the synchronized sender, we consider n interferers transmitting
concurrently, using the same modulation. These signals may not be synchro-
nized to the receiver and each may carry its own payload. This introduces
three additional parameters that influence the signal, the time offset τi, the
carrier phase offset ϕc,i, and the information bits βk,i. With a positive τi, an
interfering signal arrives later at the receiver than the synchronized signal.
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The signal at the receiver for interferer i is given by
ui (t; τi, ϕc,i) = bI,i (t− τi) cosωp (t− τi) cos (ωct+ ϕc,i)
+ bQ,i (t− τi) sinωp (t− τi) sin (ωct+ ϕc,i) . (4.5)
We assume that the phase offsets ϕc,i are constant for the duration of
a packet, i.e., there is no carrier frequency offset during a transmission. In
our experiments in Section 8.1, we show that this assumption is reasonable
because receiver implementations are compensating for possible drifts. For
convenience, we express the pulse phase offset caused by τi as ϕp,i = ωpτi.
Other Modulation Schemes
While our results are derived for the MSK modulation, it is possible to adapt
them to other variants of the phase shift keying (PSK) modulation. We briefly
describe the differences to major variants and highlight how these affect the
analysis. Further details on the relationship between PSK modulation schemes
can be found in Proakis and Salehi (2007) and Pasupathy (1979).
Offset QPSK. O-QPSK with a half-sine pulse shape is identical to MSK
(Schmid, 2006) and the results therefore also apply for this modulation. If
O-QPSK is used in combination with rectangular pulse shaping instead, the
signal is then given by
sO−QPSK (t) =
1√
2
(aI (t) cosωct+ aQ (t) sinωct) .
The altered pulse shape leads to the omission of the factor cosωpt present in
(4.1), because the rectangular shaping is already included in the information
signal a (t). This leads to a simplification of our MSK results because pulse
phase offsets ϕp that are caused by the time offset τ are not present.
Quadrature PSK. Considering QPSK, the change from O-QPSK is the
missing time shift T in the quadrature phase. This leads to a different infor-
mation signal for the Q phase,
a′Q (t) =
∞∑
k=−∞
αQk Π
(
t− 2kT
2T
)
.
When adapting our results to QPSK, this affects the indices k of the colliding
bits.
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Binary PSK. This scheme considers only the in-phase components of
QPSK, its signal is given by
sBPSK (t) =
1√
2
aI (t) cosωct.
This simplifies the derivations and results further, because there is no contri-
bution from the Q phase signal in collisions.
4.4.2. Channel Model
In our model, we use an additive collision channel. The relation for the output
signal is
r (t) = As s (t) +
n∑
i=1
Au,i ui (t; τi, ϕc,i) + n (t) . (4.6)
Each signal is scaled by a positive, real-valued factor A, which contains both,
possible signal amplifications by the sender and path loss effects that reduce
the power at the receiver. In our evaluation, we use the Signal to Interference
Ratio (SIR) at the receiver, given by SIR = A2s/
(∑n
i=1A
2
u,i
)
, to characterize
the power relationship of the interfering signals. The contribution of all noise
effects is accumulated in the linear noise term n (t); possible instantiations
are a noiseless channel or a white Gaussian noise channel.
4.4.3. Receiver Model
In the final component of the model, we feed the signals’ superposition r (t)
into an optimal receiver to discern the detected bits. The signal is demodu-
lated and fed into one of three detector implementations: one for uncoded
bits, and two variants of DSSS decoding.
Demodulation
Demodulation is performed for I and Q individually and the bits are then
interleaved. We limit our discussion to the I component for brevity.
We use the matched filter function φI (t) = (2/T ) cosωpt cosωct and low-
pass filtering for downconversion and demodulation, which is the optimal
receiver for noiseless and Gaussian channels in the sense that it minimizes
the bit error probability Proakis and Salehi (2007, Sec. 4.3). The received
signal r (t) is multiplied by φI (t) and integrated for each bit period k to form
the decision variable
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oˆIk = Λ
I
r (k) =
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
r (t)φI (t) dt. (4.7)
The resulting (real) value is called soft bit. Because the combination of the
interferers in the received signal is linear, the individual contributions can be
divided into integrals for each signal:
oˆIk = Λ
I
s (k) +
n∑
i=1
ΛIui (k) + Λ
I
n (k) .
In our analytical evaluation in the following section, we derive closed-form
expressions for ΛIui and Λ
Q
ui
to analyze the receiver output after a signal
collision.
We point out that this simplified model does not include receiver-side
techniques such as Automatic Gain Control (AGC) or phase tracking; however,
we conjecture that the reception performance is still comparable. In fact, as
our experiments in Section 8.1 show, this assumption is justified and the
simplified model is able to predict the reception behavior of real-world receiver
implementations with good accuracy. We leave the investigation on the effects
of these advanced techniques to future work.
Uncoded Bit Detection
The detection operation for uncoded transmissions is slicing, essentially a
sign operation on the demodulation output, which results in binary output
ok ∈ {±1}. Thus, a bit of the SoI is flipped if the contribution of the interferers
changes the bit’s sign.
DSSS Decoding
For coded transmissions, the number of chips exceeds the bits in a symbol,
i.e., even if several chips are flipped it is still possible to decode a symbol
correctly. We consider 2b symbols ξ with chipping sequence cξ, each with a
block length of B bit (i.e., the number of chips). For example, we have b = 4,
B = 32 in ieee .. (see also Table 4.1).
We differentiate two modes of operation for the DSSS decoder, namely
hard decision decoding (HDD) and soft decision decoding (SDD) (Proakis
and Salehi, 2007).
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Symbol Definition
k′ = k − bτ/2T c Correction factor for the bits active in a decision interval
kQ′ = k − b(τ + T ) /2T c Correction factor for Q bits during I detection
kI′ = k − b(τ − T ) /2T c Correction factor for I bits during Q detection
τ = τ − 2k′T Relative shift in a bit of interest k
τQ = τ + T − 2kQ′T Relative shift in a bit of interest k for the leaking Q-phase
τ I = τ − T − 2kI′T Relative shift in a bit of interest k for the leaking I-phase
Table 4.2.: Correction factors used in the derivations.
Hard Decision Decoding
In HDD, the decoder uses sliced (binary) values ok as its input, and then
chooses the symbol with the highest bit-wise cross-correlation of all chipping
sequences. In this way, HDD can be viewed as an additional step that takes
a group of uncoded bits with B elements (from the uncoded bit detection
described above) to determine a symbol σHDj , i.e., a group of b bits. For HDD,
the decoder is given by
σHDj = arg max
0≤ξ<2b
∣∣∣∣∣
B−1∑
k=0
ojB+k cξ,k
∣∣∣∣∣ . (4.8)
Soft Decision Decoding
In SDD, the real-valued, unquantized demodulator output oˆk (soft bits) is
used as decoder input directly, in contrast to the binary values ok used in
HDD. This is beneficial because soft bits provide a measure of detection
confidence and demodulation quality, and thus adds weighting to the bits
used in the cross-correlation. The determined symbol is denoted as σSDDj .
4.5. Mathematical Analysis
Based on the system model in Figure 4.2, we analyze the contributions of
each interfering signal to the overall demodulator output; the sum of these
contributions is the decision variable of bit detection. We first present the
general case considering all system parameters in theorem 4.1. Subsequently,
we illustrate its interpretation using selected parameter combinations. The
new notation that is used to represent index or time offset conversions are
collected in Table 4.2.
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Theorem 4.1. For an interfering MSK signal u (t) with offset parameters τ
and ϕc, the contribution to the demodulation output ΛIu (k) is given by1
ΛIu (k) =
1
2T
Au
{
cosϕc
(
cosϕp
(
τβIk−1 + (2T − τ) βIk
)− 2T
pi
sinϕp
(
βIk−1 − βIk
))
− sinϕc
(
sinϕp
(
τQβQ
kQ′−1 +
(
2T − τQ) βQ
kQ′
)
+
2T
pi
cosϕp
(
βQ
kQ′−1 − βQkQ′
))}
.
The proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix B. To provide a
better understanding of the effects of the parameters, we focus on selected
parameter constellations and discuss the resulting equations. Then we revisit
theorem 4.1 and discuss the combination of effects.
4.5.1. Synchronized Signal
In the simplest case both offsets, time and phase, are zero, i.e., the interfering
signal is also fully synchronized to the receiver. The result is given by
ΛIu (k) = Auβ
I
k .
The signal’s contribution to the k-th bit is ΛIu (k) = AuβIk . The bit decision
of bit k, i.e., the sign of the equation, is governed by βIk . The magnitude
of the contribution is controlled by the amplitude of the signal Au, and
thus stronger signals lead to a greater contribution to the decision variable
oˆk. As an example, consider two signals s (t) and u (t) that are both fully
synchronized to the receiver. The detector output of bit k is then AsαIk+AuβIk .
If both senders transmit the same bit (αIk = βIk), then the signals interfere
constructively and push the decision variable further away from zero. If, on
the other hand, the bits are different, then the decision variable has the sign
of the stronger signal; this is the well-known power capture effect for a single
bit.
4.5.2. Carrier Phase Offset
Next, we analyze the effect of carrier phase offsets when the signals are fully
time-synchronized (τ = 0), as shown in Figure 4.4. The result is given by
ΛIu (k) = Au
(
cosϕcβ
I
k −
1
pi
sinϕc
(
βQk−1 − βQk
))
.
1We omit the subscript i for clarity in the equations. The results for the quadrature phase
are given by the same equations when the roles of I and Q are exchanged.
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Figure 4.4.: Effect of carrier phase offset ϕc in a collision: several bits influence
the bit decision on bit k in a collision between two signals. The
carrier phase offsets lead to a leakage of the quadrature phase,
and because the Q-bits are staggered, there is an additional shift
of T in the bit indices. The active bits in the decision interval
are highlighted.
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Figure 4.5.: Example of a time offset τ during a detection: three bits influence
the bit decision on the second bit in a collision between two
signals. The active bits in the decision interval are highlighted
(the synchronized sender’s bit αI1 and interferer’s in-phase bits
βI0 and βI1).
We observe two effects of the carrier phase offset. First, the bit contribution
of βIk is scaled by cosϕc ≤ 1, which leads to reduced absolute values (and thus
a smaller contribution to the decision variable) and potentially causes the bit
βIk to flip for ϕc ∈ ((pi/2, ) (3/2)pi). Second, the quadrature phase starts to
leak into the decision variable and thus two additional bits βQk−1, β
Q
k influence
the outcome. This contribution, however, is scaled by pi−1 sinϕc, and only
appears when the two Q bits are alternating during the integration interval.
In essence, uncontrolled carrier phase offsets may lead to unpredictable bits
in the detector output because of carrier phase offset induced bit flips.
4.5.3. Time Offset
If the signals are phase-matched but shifted in time, the detector output is
given by
ΛIu (k) =
1
2T
Au
(
cosϕp
(
τβIk−1 + (2T − τ) βIk
)− 2T
pi
sinϕp
(
βIk−1 − βIk
))
.
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Figure 4.6.: Example of time and phase offsets combined: the decision on the
second bit (k = 1) is influenced by four bits in this example (the
synchronized sender’s bit αI1, the interferer’s in-phase bits βI0 and
βI1 due to time shifts, and quadrature bit β
Q
0 from carrier phase
offsets).
We make three observations here. The bit index k needs to be adjusted
because bits may be time-shifted into the integration interval, see Figure 4.5;
the new index is given by k′ = k − bτ/2T c, with b·c denoting the floor
function. We call these active bits because they contribute to the bit decision.
These bits overlap partially or fully, and their active time duration is τ =
τ−2 bτ/2T cT , the underscore signifies that its value is confined to the interval
[0; 2T ). However, these bits do not contribute to the decision directly but are
scaled by cosϕp, which is caused by the half-sine pulse shaping of MSK. This
scaling means that bit contributions are diminished and may be flipped by
certain time offsets. Finally, a term scaled by pi−1 is introduced that is only
present when bits are alternating. However, these bits are the same in-phase
bits βIk−1, βIk , the Q phase does not leak in this setting.
4.5.4. Both Offsets
Finally, when both offsets are present as in theorem 4.1, we can interpret the
result as a combination of the above effects. A graphical illustration of the
active bits is shown in Figure 4.6. Due to the staggering of bits (the Q bits
are delayed by T ), the indices of leaking bits of the Q phase also need to
be adjusted, the new index is kQ′ = k − b(τ + T ) /2T c, and the active time
interval τQ is derived similarly to above.
4.5.5. Analysis Summary
In summary, we observe that the contribution of the interfering signal is
complex and that ϕc and ϕp can potentially flip the original bits βIk . This
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should be bad news for collision-aware protocols that use identical payload to
achieve constructive interference (e.g., SCIF (Wang, Y. He, et al., 2012)):
these bits can flip easily and then generate destructive interference. However,
coding helps to alleviate these negative effects as we will see in the next
section.
4.6. Mathematical Evaluation
Equipped with the closed-form analytical model of the bit-wise receiver out-
puts, we systematically explore the parameter space of the reception of con-
current transmissions in detail.
4.6.1. Methodology
In order to numerically study the transmission reception success under inter-
ference we perform so-called Monte Carlo simulations (see Jain (1991)); that
means we do time-static simulations of independent packet transmissions in
which we randomly vary the analytical model’s parameters to investigate
their influence on performance parameters such as packet reception ratio, bit
and symbol error rate. Conceptually, the simulator is just a software version
of the mathematical model (written in Python) applied to a whole packet; it
is not meant to validate the model but to experiment with randomly chosen
values for the model parameters and to provide more insights on the suc-
cess probability of concurrent transmissions. The simulation code is available
for download at http://disco.cs.uni-kl.de/content/collisions; there,
the interested reader can also find an interactive visualization of the model.
For most experiments, the time offset between sender and interferer is
fixed and is our primary factor in the numerical analysis, i.e., in the plots
we show the reception performance depending on the time offset. The other
parameters of the model are treated as secondary factors and are randomly
varied. Generating 1,000 independent packet transmissions for each data
point in the presented graphs thus represents the secondary factors’ average
contribution to the reception success. We provide more details on the choices
for the model’s parameters for sender and channel in the following.
Instantiation of the Sender Model
For ease of presentation, we mainly consider the presence of one synchronized
sender and one interferer; we denote these parties as S and I with signals
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s (t) and u (t), respectively. In Section 4.6.2, we consider the n interferer case
separately. We analyze the reception performance of groups of associated bits,
or packets; in this case, a single bit error leads to a packet drop. The packet
reception ratio (PRR) is the fraction of packets that arrive without errors
divided by the total number of packets. We use packets with a length of 64 bit.
We consider two categories of colliding packets, either with independent (S
and I trying to exploit spatial reuse) or identical content (αk = βk, as it
is the case for collision-aware flooding protocols). The bits to send are cho-
sen in the following manner: for uncoded transmissions, αk is drawn bitwise
i.i.d. from a Bernoulli distribution over {−1, 1}, and either the same proce-
dure is performed for βk (independent packets) or simply copied over from
αk (identical packets). For coded packets, we draw symbols i.i.d. uniform
random from {0, . . . , 15} and spread these symbols according to the chipping
sequences defined by the ieee .. standard (2006, Sec. 6.5). This means
that 4 bit groups are first spread to 32 bit chipping sequences before they
are transmitted in αk, βk. The chipping sequences are given in Table 4.1.
Note that for symbols 1–7, the chipping sequences are shifted versions of the
symbol 0, while for the other half (symbols 8–15), the quadrature-phase bits
are inverted.
In accordance to the literature (Rappaport, 2001), as the carrier phase
offset is hard to control because of oscillators drifts and other phase changes
during transmission, we draw ϕc i.i.d. uniform randomly from [0; 2pi) for each
packet unless stated otherwise. On the other hand, we use the same time
offset τ for all packets because experimental work shows that this timing can
be precisely controlled. For example, Glossy (Ferrari et al., 2011) achieves
a timing precision of 500 ns over 8 hops with 96% probability, and Wang,
Y. Liu, et al. (2014) report a 95% percentile time synchronization error of
at most 250 ns. For our simulations, we used 1,000 packets for each value of
τ .
Instantiation of the Channel Model
To concentrate on the impact of signal interference, we consider a noiseless
channel. This is a well-accepted assumption when both signals are significantly
above noise floor level (Poisel, 2011, Sec. 8). We set As = 1 and Au = SIR−
1
2 .
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(a) Uncoded transmissions.
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(b) DSSS with hard decision decoding.
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(c) DSSS with soft decision decoding.
Figure 4.7.: The capture threshold for two colliding packets with independent
payload, varying with the signals’ power ratio SIR and time offset
(τ = 0 indicates that the signals overlap fully).
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(b) DSSS with hard decision decoding.
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(c) DSSS with soft decision decoding.
Figure 4.8.: Effect of signal to interference ratio SIR on the PRR for inde-
pendent payload. Filled markers represent the reception of the
synchronized sender’s packets, empty markers represent the re-
ception of the interferer’s packets.
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4.6.2. Reception of the Synchronized Signal of Interest
Capture Threshold Under Independent Payload
In our first case study, we consider the transmission of independent payload.
This situation occurs, e.g., when two uncoordinated senders detect a clear
channel, transmit, and the packets collide at the receiver. Our metric of
interest is the PRR of the SoI, i.e., we observe the probability to overcome
the collision. The results for three classes of receivers are shown in Figure 4.7
and Figure 4.8.
Uncoded transmissions. From Figure 4.7a, we observe that the capture
threshold is a good model to describe the PRR of interfering, uncoded trans-
missions. If the SoI is stronger by a threshold δSIR of 2 dB, all its packets
are received.2 This behavior persists for all choices of τ , i.e., packet reception
is independent from the properties of the interfering signal (we only see a
minor periodic effect). Below the threshold, there is a narrow transitional
region with non-zero PRR. Under uncoded transmissions, our model is able
to recover the classical capture threshold for MSK and is in accordance to
experimental results in the literature (Gezer et al., 2010; Son et al., 2006).
In Figure 4.8a, we observe for uncoded transmissions and in the negative SIR
regime that the reception of the interferer’s packets is poor (max. 30% PRR)
even with perfect time synchronization (τ = 0). The synchronized sender
requires a positive SIR for a high PRR independent of the interferers timing,
and the transitional region is narrow.
Hard decision decoding. When considering HDD (Figure 4.7b), we note
that the threshold abstraction is still valid and the performance improvement
of coding is only 1 dB (the coding gain is canceled when the same chipping
sequences are used). In the transitional region, there is a wider parameter
range that results in non-zero PRRs, e.g., when τ is close to integer values
(and thus cosϕp ≈ 0), we observe a better PRR for S. These results show
that coding with HDD yields only limited benefits if all senders use identical
chipping sequences. In Figure 4.8b, we observe that the interferer’s packets
have an increasing chance of reception, strongly depending on the timing. For
the synchronized sender, the transitional region is widened significantly.
Soft decision decoding. Finally, for SDD we observe a strong dependence
between PRR and time offset (Figure 4.7c). Only for positions without chip-
2For the numerical values of δSIR shown in the figures, we used a PRR threshold of 90%.
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ping sequence shifts (τ = 0, and because of the way ieee .. sequences
are chosen3, τ = 4kT , k ∈ Z) the performance is comparable to the HDD case.
For different time shifts, we can achieve a 6–8 dB coding gain despite the use
of identical chipping sequences; especially for offsets τ = 4kT + 2T , we can
achieve a clear coding gain. The reason is that soft bits contain additional
information on the detection confidence, which helps to improve the detection
performance in the cross-correlation. Again, Figure 4.8c shows this behavior
for selected values of τ from a different point of view.
This insight suggests that two senders may benefit from coding even when
using independent payloads, provided that they time their collisions precisely.
This may help to increase the number of opportunities for concurrent transmis-
sions, i.e., interfering nodes can be much closer to a receiver and still achieve
the same PRR performance. In other words, a constant capture threshold is
too conservative when collision timing can be precisely controlled, because
the performance of SDD is very sensitive to time offsets.
Capture Threshold under Identical Payload
When considering the collisions of identical packets, we observe very different
results (Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11): a good reception performance is possible
despite even a negative SIR.4
Uncoded transmissions. For uncoded transmissions, the PRR perfor-
mance is shown in Figure 4.10a. While in this case the threshold for a PRR
of 100% is still equal to the independent payload case, substantially more
packets are received in the transitional region with time shifts less than
±0.75T . However, PRRs around 30% are usually not sufficient to boost the
performance of network protocols. The reason for this limited performance is
the carrier phase offset ϕc: with negative SIR, the interfering signal dominates
the bit decision at the receiver, and with larger offsets ϕc ∈ ((pi/2) ; (3/2) pi,
the term cosϕc changes its sign and flips all subsequent bits. In this sense, the
literature conjecture that constructive interference is the reason for the good
performance of flooding protocols (Wang, Y. He, et al., 2012; Wang, Y.
Liu, et al., 2014) is only valid if the receiver is synchronized to the strongest
signal and if the phase offset ϕc can be neglected. However, because the
collisions start during the preamble when using such protocols, successful
3See Table 4.1. The chipping sequences are not independently chosen, they constitute
shifted versions of a single generator sequence with shifts of 4 IQ bits.
4We note that with increasing time offsets τ the PRR performance approaches the results
for independent payloads, see Figure 4.12.
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(a) Uncoded transmissions.
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(b) DSSS with hard decision decoding.
−1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Time offset τ (/T )
−50
−40
−30
−20
−10
0
10
Si
gn
al
po
w
er
ra
tio
(S
IR
)
δSIR
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0.9
1.0
Pa
ck
et
re
ce
pt
io
n
ra
tio
(P
R
R
)
(c) DSSS with soft decision decoding.
Figure 4.10.: The capture threshold for colliding packets with identical con-
tent depending on the power ratio SIR and the time offset τ . In
all three figures, we show the threshold δSIR for identical and
uncoded payload as reference.
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(b) DSSS with hard decision decoding.
−30 −20 −10 0 10
Signal power ratio SIR (/dB)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pa
ck
et
re
ce
pt
io
n
ra
tio
τ =
0.0T
0.5T
1.0T
1.5T
(c) DSSS with soft decision decoding.
Figure 4.11.: Effect of signal to interference ratio SIR on the PRR for identical
payload. Because both use the same payload, only filled markers
are present in contrast to Figure 4.8.
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synchronization cannot be ensured. Therefore, there must be another mech-
anism that recovers flipped bits. In Figure 4.11a^, we also observe that the
PRR varies from approx. 30% to 100% and is highly dependent on the SIR.
Hard decision decoding. The reception performance of coded messages
provides a hint in this direction (Figure 4.10b). We observe a corridor of τ
values (τ = ±0.2T or 100 ns in IEEE 802.15.4) that has a PRR of 60–80% in
the center (note the larger SIR scale on the y-axis). Figure 4.11b shows that
the PRR takes two values that are more stable across the SIR range: in the
negative SIR regime the PRR is around 65%, and 100% in the positive SIR
regime. The reason is that when two signals with identical payload collide
with a small time offset, a reception is still possible even if the interfering
signal is far stronger. This suggests that the interfering signal is received
instead of the SoI, and that coding helps to overcome bit flips of βk induced
by the carrier phase. The explanation is a property of (4.8): even if all bits
are flipped by cosϕc, the (absolute) correlation is still maximal for the correct
chipping sequence. This shows that DSSS used in IEEE 802.15.4 is a key
factor to make the collision-aware protocols work.
Soft decision decoding. The experimentally observed performance in the
literature is even superior to Figure 4.10b (Dutta, Dawson-Haggerty,
et al., 2010; Ferrari et al., 2011; Wang, Y. He, et al., 2012). Taking SDD
into account, this gap is closed (Figure 4.10c). There is a strong center region
for τ ≤ ±0.3T , or 150 ns in 802.15.4, with a PRR of approximately 90%. This
behavior is also followed in Figure 4.11c. Now, this matches well with existing
experimental results. This means that the reception performance is very good
in this center region independent of the SIR, i.e., no power control is required
and perfect time synchronization is unnecessary for successful reception.
Effect of Several Interferers
In this subsection, we consider the effect of one strong interferer compared to
several interferers with the same power when combined, but evenly distributed
across the interferers. We consider the following scenario: all interferers are
time-synchronized (τi = 0), but each has an i.i.d. uniform random phase offset
ϕc,i (and independent payload bits βk,i if different content is assumed). The
interference power varies with n
2
PSoI for a number of interferers n ∈ {1, . . . , 8},
with each interferer having a signal power at the receiver of 1
2
PSoI.
Under the classical capture threshold model both interference types share
the same SIR and thus lead to the same PRR at the receiver. However, as we
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Figure 4.13.: Reception ratio for SDD under one strong interferer or n weaker
interferers, but all with equal received power. For identical pay-
load the difference is small, for independent payload several
interferers are more destructive than one.
observe in Figure 4.13, this is only the case for identical payload, for indepen-
dent payload n interferers prove to be more destructive despite having the
same signal power. While experimental results by Ferrari et al. suggested this
result (2011, Fig. 12) for identical payload, the root cause is now explained
by our model: a single interferer is more likely affected by high attenuation
(cosϕc ≈ 0) than n independent interferers, resulting in a higher likelihood of
destructive interference. However, in case of identical payload, even an effec-
tive interferer is still received correctly in 90% of the cases. The observation
for independent payload reveals another problem of SINR models: relying on
the signal power ratio alone discards the crucial effects of each interferer’s
offsets.
4.6.3. Reception of Interfering Signals with
Independent Payload
Our results explain why and when collision-aware protocols work even with-
out power control: coding enables the reception of interfering signals despite
carrier phase and time offsets. In this section, we revisit the case of indepen-
dent payload but focus our interest now on the reception of the interfering
signal, i.e., we treat the interfering signal u (t) as the SoI and observe the
reception of βk instead of αk. Related work by Pöpper et al. (2011) shows
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(a) Uncoded transmissions.
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(b) DSSS with hard decision decoding (HDD).
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(c) DSSS with soft decision decoding (SDD).
Figure 4.14.: Reception regions of an interfering signal with independent pay-
load. For reference the reception threshold for a synchronized
signal δSIR (from Figure 4.7a) is also shown.
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that for uncoded systems the reception of interfering signals is indeterministic;
in contrast, we show analytically and experimentally (Section 8.1) that real
systems can receive unsynchronized, interfering packets reliably when using
coded messages.
Uncoded transmissions. This case is shown in Figure 4.14a. In this case,
a reception is only successful if bits are not flipped by either ϕc or ϕp, and we
observe a PRR of 20–30% in the center region (SIR < −10 dB and |τ | < 0.5T )
in our evaluation. The reason for the poor reception performance is visible
in Figure 4.15a; the acceptable parameter values of τ and ϕc that lead to an
error-free packet reception have tight constraints. The interfering signal must
hit into a capture zone defined by the signal parameters, which permits the
signal to have only small time and carrier phase offsets.
Hard decision decoding. In this setting, the PRR in the central area
increases to approx. 60% (Figure 4.14b). In Figure 4.15b, we see the reason
for the increase: while the general shape is the same, we see a second capture
zone around ϕc = ±pi. There are two explanations for this. First, we use the
same sliced bits from the uncoded case as input for DSSS correlation, which
thus possess the same error characteristics. Second, because of the use of
absolute correlation values in the correlation (see (4.8)), the adverse effect of
large phase offsets can be repaired. Specifically, this means that even if all
bits are flipped, the correlation value is still maximal for the correct chipping
sequence. This use of DSSS thus doubles the PRR of an interfering signal.
Soft decision decoding. Finally, in Figure 4.14c, we see a central area
below SIR = −23 dB and a width of 0.25T that has a PRR for the interfering
signal of approx. 90%. This means that, if the power difference is large enough,
a receiver can ignore a synchronized signal and recover the interfering one
despite its offsets. Figure 4.15c shows this in terms of the capture zone. The
eye-shaped regions are much wider compared to the other receiver designs,
and especially for the central region with minor deviations of τ , the SER is
negligible. Problems in the reception only occur for carrier phase offsets such
that cosϕc ≈ 0. These results show that interfering signals can indeed be
received, which helps in collision-aware protocols or other intentional collisions,
e.g., in message manipulation attacks on the physical layer. To validate this
new result, we present an experimental study of such receptions with real
receiver implementations next.
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(a) Bit error rate for uncoded transmissions.
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(b) Symbol error rate for DSSS/HDD.
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(c) Symbol error rate for DSSS/SDD.
Figure 4.15.: Relation between error rates and signal parameters, time off-
set τ and carrier phase offset ϕc (with SIR = −40dB). An
unsynchronized packet is successfully received if the parameter
combinations fall inside the dark capture zones.
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4.7. Discussion
Here, we provide a summary of our main findings and highlight key conclu-
sions for the design of protocols that leverage concurrent transmissions. In
particular, we summarize how the notion of capture zones enables engineers
and protocol designers to choose optimal parameter ranges for signal power
ratio, time offset, and carrier phase offset to ensure a successful reception
despite collisions.
4.7.1. Signal to Interference Ratio SIR
Our model confirms that when the SoI is above the SIR threshold δSIR ≈
2dB, then a successful reception is guaranteed (the capture effect). This is
consistent with existing results; for the CC2420 transceiver, Gezer et al.
(2010), Maheshwari et al. (2008), Dutta, Dawson-Haggerty, et al.
(2010), and Son et al. (2006) report an experimentally observed threshold
of about 3 dB. Considering that their channels were not noise-free and that
SINR measurements were collected by the radio transceivers themselves,
rather than calibrated measurement equipment such that inaccuracies may
arise, this is consistent with our results. If it can be ensured that the stronger
signal arrives first and the synchronization process succeeds, the SIR-based
capture threshold is a valid model for receiver behavior.
A different matter is the case when the SoI is located in the negative SIR
regime, i.e., the interfering signal is stronger than the SoI. This situation
occurs if an interferer is closer to the receiver or the synchronization process
fails because of a collision during the preamble (which is the case, for example,
for the collision-aware flooding protocols). Our model gives better insights
in this situation and shows that a reception may still be possible no matter
what SIR, given that the interfering signal parameters are in the capture zone
as defined by the time offset τ and carrier phase offset ϕc. Valid settings for
these parameters are discussed below.
4.7.2. Time Offset τ
As a guideline derived from the capture zone, the time offset τ should be below
T/2 for successful concurrent transmissions with identical content, which
translates to 250ns for IEEE 802.15.4. Thus network flooding protocols, for
example Glossy, should aim to keep the transmission start time error below
this value to ensure a desired PRR above 75%. If τ < 200 ns can be ensured,
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the achievable PRR is approximately 90%. We note that this ensures worst-
case performance (i.e., the SoI is always in the negative SIR regime). The
actual performance may be higher in situations with positive SIR or successful
synchronization.
4.7.3. Carrier Phase Offset ϕc
If the carrier frequency offset at the receiver can be precisely controlled by the
senders, there are several options. Interferers can choose ϕc ≈ ±pi2 to minimize
their effect on the SoI, reducing their influence to signal demodulation. On
the other hand, interferers could aim for the capture zone (e.g., |ϕc| < 0.4pi
or |ϕc| > 0.6pi for τ = 0 and SDD) to ensure that their signal is received
without errors. There are, however, few approaches in the literature that
aim to exploit this. The reason is that the carrier phase at another physical
location is hard to predict except in static and free space scenarios because
of fading and multipath effects. Pöpper et al. (2011) show for uncoded
QPSK that carrier phase offsets are the major hindrance for a (malicious)
interferer to control the bit decisions. In contrast, the results based on our
model suggest that such precise phase control is not necessary when DSSS is
used, and that intentional message manipulations by deliberate interference
are indeed a real threat (Wilhelm, Schmitt, and Lenders, 2012).
4.7.4. Number of Concurrent Interferers
Our results in Section 4.6.2 explain why the number of interferers only has
a small impact on reception performance for concurrent transmissions us-
ing identical payload. Ferrari et al. (2011) observed this behavior in their
experiments, achieving a stable PRR above 98% for 2–10 concurrent trans-
missions. Maheshwari et al. (2008) observed that the SIR threshold is not
varying with an increasing number of interferers. On the other hand, Lu
and Whitehouse (2009) reported a decreasing PRR when the number of
interferers is increased. However, the Flash Flooding protocol relies on cap-
ture, such that increased time offsets may also influence the results. Some
related work claims that a greater number of concurrent transmitters cause
problems (Doddavenkatappa et al., 2013; Wang, Y. He, et al., 2012)
because “the probability of the maximum time displacement across different
transmitters exceeding the required threshold for constructive interference”
may increase. Our model shows that these protocol-related issues should be
addressed with more precise timing synchronization across the network. For
independent payload, we show that 2–3 interferers are sufficient to reduce the
65
4. Understanding the Reception of Colliding Packets
PRR significantly. This confirms the effect reported by Gezer et al. (2010)
that the PRR decreases with an increasing number of interferers.
4.8. Summary
In this chapter, we developed a comprehensive analytical model for concur-
rent transmissions of ieee .. over a wireless channel. As shown in
an extensive parameter space exploration, the model recovers insights from
experimental results found in the literature and going beyond that, explains
the root causes for successful concurrent transmissions exploited in a new
generation of sensor network protocols that intentionally generate collisions
to increase network throughput or to reduce latency. Our results reveal that
power capture alone is not sufficient to explain the performance of such
protocols. Rather, coding is an essential factor in the success of these proto-
cols because it crucially widens the capture zone of acceptable signal offsets,
increasing the probability of successful reception.
Considering effective jamming and its modeling, we observed that the use
of the SIR threshold results in acceptable precision, especially when the
signals in the collision are not correlated. For this reason, we mainly consider
the power ratio of colliding signals in the protection analysis, but we note
that there is additional potential to increase the jamming effectiveness with
precisely timed jamming.
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5.1. Protection Constraints
In this chapter, we analyze the nature of protection offered by our system
of distributed guardians. For ease of exposition, we deliberately use simple
propagation and receiver models to deliver the key insights on the concept
(we use log-distance path loss and an SINR-based receiver model). The appli-
cability of these models is established in the previous chapter; especially the
SINR was shown to be a good and conservative for interfering signals with
independent payload, or interfering signals with different waveforms.
5.1.1. Primer on Guardian Detection Sensitivity
In order to correctly detect and demodulate a packet at a receiver, the incom-
ing signal power at the antenna must be greater than the receiver sensitivity.
This sensitivity represents the minimum signal power at the antenna that re-
sults in a specified packet error performance. The receiver sensitivity is given
by S = NTNFSNRmin (Adamy, 2001), where NT is the thermal noise, NF is
the noise figure of the particular receiver and SNRmin a modulation-specific
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threshold for the minimum required signal-to-noise ratio. For ieee ..-
compliant receivers with O-QPSK modulation on the 2.4GHz band, optimal
coherent detection, and a maximum packet error rate of 1%, the theoretical
sensitivity limit is Smin = −112.2 dBm. However the standard only demands
a sensitivity of at least −85dBm, and commercial radio modules exhibit
sensitivities ranging between −92 dBm to −110dBm.1
5.1.2. Protection Conditions
For a guardian g to protect a victim node v from an attacker a, the guardian
must be able to detect the signals from the attacker and interfere with the
attacker’s signal at the victim node such that the packet is discarded. This
leads to the following two necessary conditions for guardian protection.
Condition 5.1 (Detection). Let Pa be the emitted signal power of the at-
tacker and L (dag) be the path loss and fading between the attacker and the
guardian. The guardian is able to detect the malicious signals iff
PaL (dag) ≥ Sg,
where Sg is the sensitivity of the guardian.
This condition ensures that the malicious signal can be classified by the
guardian and enables it to initiate defensive countermeasures.
Condition 5.2 (Destruction). Let Pa be the emitted signal power of the
attacker, Pg be the emitted power of the guardian’s interference signal, and
L (dav),L (dgv) be the path loss between attacker–victim and guardian–victim,
respectively. The guardian is able to destroy the packet at the victim if the
signal-to-interference ratio is below a certain threshold
PaL (dav)
PgL (dgv)
< γSIR,
where the threshold γSIR is determined by the modulation scheme, the in-
terference waveform and how well the victim node is able to suppress such
interference. If the interference waveform is zero-mean white gaussian noise,
the threshold γSIR is between 0 dB and 3 dB according to the ieee ..
standard (2006). More effective waveforms by the guardians leads to higher
1An online comparison of various commercial receiver implementations with links
to the corresponding data sheets is available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Comparison_of_802.15.4_radio_modules
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values of γSIR. We evaluated this value for the MICAz platform with several
waveforms in Section 8.2.3 and find an additional gain of 3–5 dB in jamming
effectiveness.
A sensor network remains protected if there exists at least one guardian
that fulfills these two conditions for each attacker and victim node pair. In the
remaining of this section, we discuss that these conditions are generally easy to
fulfill as there exists a large asymmetry between the capability requirements
for attackers and guardians.
5.2. Attacker Models
The goal of the attacker is to inject packets of its choice into the protected
network. We consider two attacker strategies against the guardians that
operate as a wireless firewall:
Definition 5.3 (Brute-force attacker Aforce). The attacker tries to overcome
the guardian’s interference by using a large transmission power Pa:
PaL(dav)
PgL(dgv)
> γSIR.
The goal of this attacker is to mitigate the interference effects at the receiver
by increasing the strength of its transmissions.
Definition 5.4 (Stealthy attacker Astealth). The attacker tries to choose a
small transmission power Pa such that the injected packet is received only by
the victim but is not detected by the guardian. The attack is successful iff
PaL(dav) ≥ Sv and PaL(dag) < Sg.
While the first strategy is easy to implement, it also leads to a steeply
increased energy cost of the attacker (an analysis for ieee .. is given
in Proposition 5.13). The second strategy is more challenging to implement
in practice as very fine-grained power control and a clever positioning of the
attacker is required to perform the attack successfully.
5.3. Attacker–Guardian Asymmetry
To illustrate the asymmetry between an attacker attempting to inject ma-
licious packets and the guardian protecting the victim nodes, we consider
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a log-normal path loss model L(d) = L0d−α, with reference path loss L0,
distance d, and path loss coefficient α. We use the following metric to capture
the asymmetry between an attacker and a guardian:
Definition 5.5 (Attack Range). The (worst-case2) attack range R is the
maximum distance dav between attacker a and victim node v such that an
attack still succeeds.
An attacker wants the attack range to be as large as possible such that it
may launch the attack from arbitrary locations and still remain undetected in
the physical world. A large attack range further makes an attacker powerful
as it can attack more nodes from a single location. From the perspective of
the network, a small attack range is desired as it forces an attacker to expose
itself in the physical world and minimizes the number of victim nodes that
an attacker may attack simultaneously. If the attacker is constrained in terms
of reachable locations, e.g., when the attacker can only attack from outside
a building, the number of sensor motes in its attack range may also be zero
for all reachable attack positions, effectively thwarting the attack.
Example 5.6. Without a guardian, the attack range RAforce of an attacker
Aforce using a powerful COTS transmitter (Pa = 20 dBm) and MICAz victims
(Sv = −94dBm) under the log-normal model with path loss parameters
specified in the ieee .. standard (2006, Annex E.5.3)3 is R = 384.51m.
The effect of an active guardian is to considerably reduce the attack range.
We derive bounds on the attack range for both attacker models Astealth and
Aforce in the following.
Proposition 5.7. The attack range RAstealth of attacker Astealth is bounded
by dvg/
(
α
√
Sv/Sg − 1
)
if a guardian is present.
Proof. To prevent detection, the attacker must satisfy two conditions simulta-
neously: its received signal power at the victim must be above the sensitivity
level of the victim and below the sensitivity of the guardian:
Pad
−α
av ≥ Sv (5.1)
Pad
−α
ag < Sg (5.2)
2This notion of attack range is under worst-case assumptions where attacker, victim,
and guardian are on one line with the victim in the middle, maximizing the distance
between attacker and guardian dag for a given attacker–victim distance dav.
3We converted the parameters given in the standard to our non-logarithmic model: refer-
ence distance d0 = 8m, α = 3.3, path loss at d0 is L0 = dα0 1058.5/10. Later derivations
use distance ratios and are thus independent of the choice of L0.
70
5.3. Attacker–Guardian Asymmetry
Following (5.1) and (5.2), the attacker must choose a power Pa that satisfies
dαavSv ≤ Pa < dαagSg. Thus, such a Pa only exists iff dαavSv < dαagSg. Using
this condition and the relation dag ≤ dav + dgv (by triangle inequality), we
find that the attacker Astealth can only remain undetected if its distance to v
satisfies
dav <
dvg
α
√
Sv/Sg − 1
. (5.3)
The bound is independent of the attacker’s transmit power.
The asymmetry with the attacker model Astealth is provided by the sensi-
tivity ratio Sv/Sg (as discussed in Section 5.1.1): the higher this ratio, the
smaller is the attack range RAstealth . Additionally, this range only applies if
the attacker maximizes its distance to the guardian, such that it has to find a
position where the attack is feasible first. The following example applies typi-
cal values to illustrate how the attack range is considerably reduced compared
to 5.6 where no guardian is present.
Example 5.8. In Section 9.2, we present an indoor application scenario
with MICAz sensor motes and a KillerBee attacker. Assuming a near-optimal
receiver at the guardian with a sensitivity of −110 dBm (−112.2 dBm is the
theoretical sensitivity limit of an ideal ieee .. receiver), tolerating a
limited number of bit errors and hence a non-zero false positive rate with a
conservative improvement of 6 dB to keep the false positive rates low (say
less than 0.001%), the sensitivity of the guardian becomes Sg = −116dBm,
resulting in a ratio Sv/Sg of 22 dB. With a maximal protection distance
dgv = 10m and α = 3.3, the attack range decreases to RAstealth = 2.75m,
which is a reduction by a factor of 140 compared to the case where no guardian
is present.
Proposition 5.9. The attack range RAforce for attacker modelAforce is bounded
by α
√
Pa/(γSIRPg)dgv.
Proof. If the attack signal is detected, a brute-force attacker has still the
opportunity to overcome the interference signal if
Pad
−α
av
Pgd−αgv
≥ γSIR.
Consequently, the attacker must choose its distance such that
dav ≤ α
√
Pa
γSIRPg
dgv. (5.4)
The attacker is assumed to be power-limited, such that this bound exists.
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Example 5.10. In Section 9.2, a sensor network with several MICAz motes
captured by an attacker is considered, which our guardian system effectively
disconnects from the network. MICAz motes (like many other COTS trans-
mitters) have a maximum output power of Pa = 0dBm, the transmit power
of a guardian node is Pg = 20 dBm, and the interference waveform being used
is assumed as γSIR ≈ 3dB. With a maximal protection distance dgv = 10m,
the attack range RAforce of the brute-force attacker is brought down to 0.70m.
Definition 5.11 (Protection coefficient). The factor ρ that couples the maxi-
mum attack range of the brute force attacker to the distance between guardian
and victim, given in dav ≤ ρdgv, with ρ = α
√
Pa
γSIRPg
, is called the protection
coefficient.
The protection coefficient is a metric for the relation between attack and
protection distance. A small value indicates that the attacker must move
in much closer for the same guardian distance dgv, which implies a larger
protection radius and thus a better protection. In Section 9.1, we evaluate
this metric in several real-world scenarios.
Last but not least, a brute-force attacker also has to pay a price in terms
of energy investment to successfully mount its attack.
Definition 5.12 (Energy cost). The energy cost of an attacker Aforce is the
ratio of the energy required by the attacker to send a packet over the energy
required by the guardian to block the packet.
Proposition 5.13. The energy cost is
Pad
−α
av ` · 32 µs
Pgd−αgv tinterfere
, (5.5)
where ` denotes the packet length in bytes and tinterfere the duration of the
interference signal from the guardian.
Example 5.14. If, for ease of exposition, we assume that the attacker and
the guardian emit at the same power and are at the same distance from the
victim, the (received) power ratio Pad−αav /Pgd−αgv is equal to one. Considering
a typical ieee .. packet size of 32 bytes and a necessary interference
duration of tinterfere = 16 µs to destroy one symbol, the energy cost is 64. In
other words, the guardian needs to invest 64 times less transmit energy to
destroy a packet than the attacker needs to invest to transmit the packet to
the victim.
72
5.4. Summary
This observation shows again an asymmetry in the required energy between
an attacker and a guardian. While an attacker might in some cases still be
able to slip through the protection of the guardians, the effort required to do
so is considerably higher than the effort required by the guardians. Therefore,
the guardians are able to effectively and efficiently control and block undesired
transmissions from attackers before they can reach the network.
5.4. Summary
We observed that the nature of protection of such a remote access control
system depends highly on the spatial distribution of all involved parties.
Because the physical layer effect of RF interference is used, the power level of
all involved signals plays a major role in the the outcome of reception, as we
have seen also in the previous chapter. However, based on the assumption that
the capture threshold yields a good approximation of receiver performance,
we have found a parameter that can be used to characterize the protection of
such a system, the protection coefficient ρ. It captures how much closer the
attacker has to approach devices in the network to attack them, in comparison
to the distance to the wireless firewall. Based on our model, we observe that
the attacker has to approach the network by less than a tenth of the guardian
distance.
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To meet the technical challenges that we defined, it is important to un-
derstand the design options that are available, as well as the performance
capabilities of the underlying systems that are used in the implementation.
This chapter gives a closer view of the design space of wireless firewalls, and
the architectural choices that influence the overall system performance and
implementation complexity, and puts forward a system architecture, called
WiFire, that realized the concept of wireless firewalls.
6.1. Design Space of Wireless Firewalls
First, we discuss alternatives for designing transparent wireless firewall sys-
tems. Due to the conflict between flexibility and real-time capability, we are
mainly concerned with the optimal mapping of the three operational steps
RF analysis, violation detection, and jamming to the computational resources
found in modern radio platforms.
6.1.1. Store-and-Forward Wireless Firewalls
Taking a step back, we start by reviewing the existing firewall design concept
of store and forward, and conceive two basic alternatives to design store-and-
forward wireless firewalls.
Enforce Store-and-Forward A wireless firewall could be inserted into
the data path as a further hop, such that standard firewall processing can be
applied since store-and-forward operation is enforced.
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While being straightforward, this approach represents a severe transparency
violation, as essentially all protocols would have to be changed and config-
ured to account for this explicit additional hop. The firewall has to rely on
the end devices to make these configurations (in particular, insert it into
their data path), hence no completely central policy enforcement is achieved.
Furthermore, it would fundamentally halve the throughput of the wireless
channel since each transmission would be doubled and the firewall could eas-
ily become a bottleneck unless it is given some priority when accessing the
wireless medium (which again may mean modifications to existing protocols).
Last but not least, such an “enforce store-and-forward” wireless firewall faces
analog threats to a regular access point with respect to impersonation; at-
tackers are likely to soon come up with rogue wireless firewalls. Our approach
avoids all of these problems by being transparent. In particular, this rules
out impersonation attacks.
Emulate Store-and-Forward A second approach could be to emulate a
store-and-forward behavior for the wireless firewall. To that end, the firewall
could jam every packet it sees, yet at the same time receive and store it, classify
and forward it if trusted. The concurrent sending (jamming) and receiving
of packets over a single channel is technically very challenging but may, in
principle, be feasible (see Choi et al. (2010) and Gollakota, Hassanieh,
et al. (2011) for first steps along these lines).
Hypothesizing its feasibility, this approach avoids the necessity of protocol
changes and special configurations of end systems. However, trusted traf-
fic is negatively affected by the wireless firewall with respect to delay and
also losses, as the firewall has a high jamming activity and thus induces a
high interference for concurrent transmissions. In particular, this is very bad
for “polite” medium access protocols like CSMA/CA. In fact, an “emulate
store-and-forward” wireless firewall almost behaves as a constant jammer,
only becoming silent if there is no activity on the wireless channel. Again,
throughput is halved because a single transmission is effectively doubled.
So, in comparison to our approach, an “emulate store-and-forward” wireless
firewall exhibits a number of disadvantages while the system challenges can
probably be considered at least as hard. To be fair, it offers the potential to
enable more complex rule sets since the classification can be done without
strict timing requirements.
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Figure 6.1.: Operation of WiFire: first, the packet’s signal is demodulated
to access its content for classification. WiFire must wait for the
payload bytes to arrive (tlisten) before the rule checker can start.
When the packet is declared malicious (after tdecide), the transmis-
sion of interference is prepared (tinit), and the offending packet
destroyed (tinterfere) before it may be received.
6.1.2. Operational Requirements
As a result from this discussion, we follow a cut-through approach for WiFire
mainly for its transparency, rising to the following challenge: there is a firm
deadline for all the actions of WiFire, namely when a packet is completely re-
ceived at the destination node. Hence, we face stringent real-time requirements
for WiFire. Thus, we are interested in the real-time performance characteris-
tics of WiFire, especially with regard to the system challenges of low-latency
and reliable packet dropping at the receiver. Starting with this chapter, we
only consider the aspects of the ieee .. standard in terms of physical
layer details.
To illustrate the operation of WiFire and to identify the technical challenges
that arise, we discuss the interception of a single malicious packet. Figure 6.1
shows our packet, a 26 byte ieee .. data packet going to the broadcast
address 0xFFFF of sub-network 0x22. The transmission duration of this packet
is 832µs, and it starts with a physical layer header, link layer header, and
payload; it ends with a 16 bit checksum (CRC). WiFire operates as follows:
• It first detects the packet using the preamble and start-of-frame delim-
iter (SFD), which signals the beginning of the packet. Then, it proceeds
to demodulate the content of the packet, gaining access to header fields
79
6. System Architecture
and payload, which is subsequently used to decide whether the packet is
malicious. The longer the reception period, denoted by tlisten, the more
content is available to classify the packet; on the other hand, if WiFire
listens for too long, it may be unable to still destroy the packet. If the
decision is based on the header fields, tlisten is 480µs, permitting a max-
imum system response time of 352µs; if the full payload is considered,
tlisten is 768µs and only 64 µs remain. This illustrates that WiFire must
fulfill very strict timing requirements to both classify and destroy the
packet.
• As soon as the necessary content is available, the rule checker is started
to compare the detected packet to the stored security policy. The exe-
cution time of the rule checker is denoted by tdecide.
• If the rule checker concludes that the packet is violating the security
policy, it initiates the transmission of a burst of interference. The time
required to set up this operation is denoted by tinit.
• Finally, the transmission of interference must reliably destroy the packet.
In the ieee .. standard, a single bit error is sufficient to destroy
the packet, even if the bit error is in the last CRC byte. The duration
of interference (tinterfere) must be long enough to force at least one bit
error, but not necessarily longer.
• The overall system response time is denoted by tresponse, which is defined
as the time from the start of classification to the end of the interference,
i.e., tresponse = tdecide + tinit + tinterfere. We aim for a response time below
64 µs.
In summary, the system must fulfill tight timing requirements; the overall
time to listen to a packet and respond must be much smaller than the packet’s
duration.
6.1.3. Architectures for Wireless Firewalls
While the strict real-time requirements mandate to stay as close to the hard-
ware as possible, this severely reduces the flexibility of the system. Thus,
we aim to build a software-defined wireless firewall, putting as much func-
tionality into programmable hardware and software as possible. Current
software-defined radio (SDR) platforms can be divided into four logical tiers:
hardware, reprogrammable hardware logic, firmware, and the host. Each tier
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can be used to implement functionality of WiFire, and has benefits and draw-
backs. We first describe these tiers and then explore different approaches to
allocating the three building blocks of WiFire to these tiers, discussing the
tradeoffs that arise.
Remote host
The prevalent architecture of SDRs is to use an RF front-end that col-
lects sampling data, performs signal processing steps (filtering, digital down-
conversion), and sends the data to a host computer. The main hindrance
for real-time applications in this architecture are the delay and bandwidth
limitations introduced by host communication. Nychis et al. (2009) show
that it is necessary to move time-critical components closer to the radio to
alleviate this problem. Recent research results show that this issue can also
be overcome with clever design (e.g., the Sora platform (Tan et al., 2009)
meets the timing requirements of 802.11g), with the benefit of keeping com-
putations on a general purpose processor (GPP) that is easy to program
and debug. On the other hand, analyzing signals along different dimensions
puts a high computational burden on the system, e.g., results with Sora show
that two dedicated cores are necessary to receive 802.11g communications.
This limitation may interfere with WiFire’s goal to support multiple wireless
technologies concurrently.
Reprogrammable hardware
Another resource readily available on current SDR platforms (such as WARP,
Sora, USRP1+2) are FPGAs. They provide a convenient way to interconnect
different hardware components on the register transfer level to form complex
systems. We can tap this resource and implement parts of WiFire in repro-
grammable hardware. Using massively parallel computations means allows to
cut the latency of the sequential GPP execution down. Further, exact timing
with an explicit clock is crucial to achieve a high precision and effectiveness
in jamming. Nguyen et al. (2014) present an FPGA-based system that
achieves a 80 ns reaction time for ieee ..
Firmware
However, an FPGA-only approach has practical disadvantages. Such systems
have long development cycles because of the complex place-and-route process.
Furthermore, WiFire has many volatile components: most importantly, the
policies must be flexible and easily reconfigurable. Frequently, these issues
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are reduced by the use of GPPs directly connected or even implemented on
the FPGA. For example, the USRP2 platform has a 50MHz aeMB softcore
on the FPGA that runs its firmware. Such processors share the practical
benefits of host-based GPPs, though their capabilities are generally limited,
prohibiting extensive computations. Yet, this hybrid approach offers a flexible
way to implement parts of a wireless firewall with real-time but without high
performance requirements.
Hardware
Parts of the functionality can also be implemented in hardware, e.g., as an
ASIC design. This results in the best achievable performance and fidelity, but
also leads to systems tailored for a specific application that cannot easily be
adapted or upgraded to different requirements. Functionality that is basic to
the operation and rarely changes is a good implementation candidate for this
tier.
6.2. The Architecture of the WiFire System
6.2.1. System Architecture
The system architecture is depicted in Figure 6.2. The workflow of the system
is (from left to right): (i) detecting and demodulating relevant transmissions,
(ii) forming decisions based on the packet content, and (iii) interfering with
malicious packets.
6.2.2. An Overview of the System Components
Next, we provide a brief description of each functional component. The details
of the implementation are given in the following chapter.
Detection Subsystem
This subsystem continuously scans the RF medium to detect any packet that
might be received by the network and receives and delivers the packet’s con-
tent to the subsequent decision subsystem. It consists of a receiver optimized
for speed that synchronizes to packets and demodulates the contained bytes,
and a framer that interprets the incoming data, providing access to header
fields and payload bytes.
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Figure 6.2.: Component diagram of the guardian implementation. We con-
sider two different rule checker implementations (firmware/
FPGA).
Decision Subsystem
The decision system is triggered when a pre-defined point in the packet is
reached (e.g., when the full link layer header is available), in order to trigger
the decision process on whether the packet should be blocked.
Rule checker: The rule checker classifies incoming packets according to a
pre-defined policy. It is the critical component for real-time operation because
the overall reaction time mainly depends on its execution time. Therefore
we have implemented and evaluated two different versions: (i) firmware code
written in C and running on the USRP2’s (soft-) micro-controller, which
offers runtime reconfigurability but is comparatively slow, and (ii) an imple-
mentation in FPGA logic that reduces the reaction time, but the security
policy must be specified at compile time. In both implementations, the rule
checker notifies the interference subsystem with an interrupt that a short
burst of interference must presently be generated to destroy the malicious
packet.
Definition of rules: The firmware-based rule checker allows to define
content-based rules in the style of iptables, defining rule chains that consist
of one or more rules, each with zero or more matches (such as source or desti-
nation address) via an administration interface. We implemented a command
line tool (wftables), which generates a data structure that can be directly
interpreted by the firmware rule checker. An example is the following rule
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definition with two matches (preventing the reception of all control packets
going to the broadcast address in PAN 0x22):
wftables -A -m dst --pan 0x22 --addr 0xFFFF
-m type --ctrl
-j DROP
This mechanism allows to define complex access policies and deploy them on
the distributed guardians. An example chain that can directly be interpreted
by WiFire’s rule checker is
wftables -A -m ftype --data # Rule 1
-m dst --mode 2 --pan 0x11 --addr 10
-j JAM
wftables -A -m ftype --ctrl # Rule 2
-m ! src --mode 2 --pan 0x11 --addr 1
-j JAM
wftables -A -j ACCEPT # Default policy
This rule set specifies that all transmissions are allowed (the default policy),
except for:
1. data frames coming from node 10 in the current networks (with the
identifying PAN ID), and
2. control frames that are sent from other source addresses than 1.
Rule 1 is used to block all data traffic from a node of choice, virtually separat-
ing it from the network. This can be used to enforce a fast node revocation,
e.g., when the keying material of this node is leaked. Rule 2 enforces that
only node 1 (e.g., the PAN coordinator) can send control messages on the
current channel to protect other nodes from being hijacked. The FPGA rule
checker uses hardware gates to compare detected packet bytes to a table of
predefined values in parallel, such that the execution time is considerably
reduced.
Selective Interference Subsystem
When a packet is classified as malicious, the guardian takes action and pre-
vents the reception of the packet by its protected sensor motes.
Waveform generator: With a software-defined radio, arbitrary waveforms
can be specified using a sequence of I/Q samples, which completely defines
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a transmitted signal. Our guardian implementation supports continuous
wave (CW), noise, and arbitrary symbols modulated using the ieee ..
2.4GHz PHY as interference waveforms.
Transmission: The I/Q samples are finally sent out on the physical layer
by modulating a jamming signal onto a carrier in the 2.4GHz band, and
amplified up to a maximum output power of 20 dBm (100mW). External
antennas and amplifiers can be used to boost the effectively radiated power
further.
6.3. Summary
When considering the optimal architecture of wireless firewalls, we discussed
that there are several feasible avenues to take. A major design goal of WiFire is
to have an extensible research platform that supports other applications than
the wireless firewall, therefore more dedicated wireless firewall systems may
take the approach to place all components closer to the hardware to achieve
better performance, and to reduce hardware costs and energy consumption.
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7.1. System Implementation Overview
We implement the guardian nodes on the USRP2 software-defined radio
(SDR) platform. The SDR paradigm allows full physical layer access by the
guardian; in contrast, off-the-shelf receivers do not allow low-latency access
to detected symbols, nor do they offer freedom in choosing the transmitted in-
terference waveform. However, these factors are crucial to enable a deep look
into packets and to use the most effective interference waveform with a given
power budget. For example, related reactive jamming systems implemented
on sensor motes (Z. He and Voigt, 2011; Martinovic, Pichota, and
Schmitt, 2009; O’Flynn, 2011) do not allow to classify based on content
and to destroy packets during transmission. Still, an implementation on the
USRP2 is not straightforward because the time to classify and intercept a
packet is below 500µs, which forces tight timing constraints on the system.
In the common host-based architecture for software radio using GNU Radio,
where digital samples are forwarded to a host via Ethernet and signal pro-
cessing is performed on the host CPU, large and non-deterministic latencies
prevent to meet real-time requirements (Nychis et al., 2009). In our imple-
mentation, we fulfill the requirements of real-time detection and subsequent
destruction of a packet on the air; we design the guardian as a stand-alone
system, completely implemented on the USRP2’s FPGA and on-board micro-
controller. The system is optimized for speed to reach reaction times of tens
of microseconds to allow access to the full payload and still reliably destroy
the packet.
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7.1.1. Implementation Guidelines
Our choice is to reuse as much as possible of the existing USRP2 design to
provide patches to the mainline code. This also requires a system design for
WiFire that is oriented on the tiers presented above. We present the rationale
of the design here.
The components with strict timing or high bandwidth requirements must
be implemented on the FPGA level. This is mainly the case for the RF
analyzers, and generally speaking the rule checker can achieve a minimal
reaction time when it is implemented on FPGA as well. The drawback of
this approach is that it lacks flexibility in the definition and modification
of rule sets. We chose to implement the rule checker in the firmware, where
the rules can directly be changed with command frames via Ethernet. The
tasks that are not time-critical are moved to the host. Here, the tasks are the
configuration of the system, and the logging.
Design tools
The firmware uses an adapted version of the gcc toolchain to target the
MicroBlaze processor and is preserved. For the RF analysis parts, we wanted
to stay close to the standard workflow of RF engineers with model-based
design tools. We designed our RF analysis components with Simulink and
generated the required Verilog code using the Xilinx code generator. This way,
we can model and simulate our sub-systems before integration into the system,
and can integrate existing work of analyzers and receiver implementations in
our system.
7.1.2. USRP2 Platform Details
The system requirements we have derived from our goals, especially the need
for real-time operation makes it necessary for us to depart from this split
architecture where RF data forwarding add additional delay; our system must
be implemented on the USRP2 itself.
USRP2 hardware description
The USRP2 platform is equipped with a Xilinx Spartan-3 FPGA running
with a clock speed of 100 MHz, which provides sufficient performance and
a fine-grained timing resolution of 10 ns per cycle. Additionally, the USRP2
has enough free resources (only 40% of the FPGA is occupied) to add our
prototype while reusing the functionality of the original system. We modified
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Figure 7.1.: WiFire’s design, showing the functional components and their
allocation to the USRP2’s resources.
the UHD FPGA code and firmware from Ettus Research. The operation of
the USRP2 is controlled by a softcore processor in FPGA logic that executes
firmware code written in C. This offers an easy integration path for our
system and a maximum of reuse. However, the sequential program execution
of the firmware may introduce larger time deviations into the system. The
magnitude of these effects are evaluated in the next section. We added a
detection module in FPGA logic that receives complex samples from the RX
DSP pipeline and interrupts the firmware on a detection event. We altered
the firmware to await such interrupts and to initiate the jamming process,
which causes the USRP2 to start sending a ready-made jamming waveform
on the channel.
7.2. Resource Mapping
In WiFire, we aim for flexibility, so we must place the components to different
tiers according to their timing and computational requirements, but with a
maximum of configurability. In this following, we identify the critical paths in
the operation of the wireless firewall, and find an appropriate mapping to the
hardware that achieves our goals. A more detailed view on the components
is given in Figure 7.1.
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7.3. Subsystem: Detection
This subsystem continuously scans the RF medium to detect any packet
that might be received by the network and receives and delivers the packet’s
content to the subsequent decision subsystem. It consists of a receiver opti-
mized for speed that synchronizes to packets and demodulates the contained
bytes, and a framer that interprets the bytes according to the ieee ..
standard, providing access to header fields and payload bytes.
7.3.1. IEEE 802.15.4 Receiver
We implemented an ieee .. receiver using coherent O-QPSK demod-
ulation and a correlating direct sequence de-spreader to recover symbols in
FPGA logic. The de-spreader removes the direct sequence spreading code
used in the 2.4GHz PHY. The receiver directly operates on the stream of
complex (I/Q) samples coming from the USRP2’s analog-to-digital converter:
it first synchronizes with the incoming preamble, then detects each detected
symbol (4 bit of information), and finally delivers it to the framer. The FPGA
implementation ensures that the detection latency is limited, we measured a
delay in the receiver below 4 µs from the presence of the signal on the channel
to the time it is available for interpretation by the rule checker.
7.3.2. Packet Framing
This component interprets the received symbols according to the ieee ..
packet definition, granting access to header fields and payload. ieee ..
supports several address modes that use varying header layouts that must be
supported by the framer. This component also notifies the rule checker that
a new packet was detected via interrupts and provides a memory mapping
that can be queried to gain access to header fields and payload bytes.
7.3.3. Detector Implementation
For every clock cycle, a new complex RF sample is available as input to the
detector module. Considering the symbol duration of 16 µs in 802.15.4, we
have 1600 clock cycles per symbol available, which enables complex detec-
tor designs. We implemented a PHY header (preamble+SFD) detector in
our prototype. First, we perform an MSK demodulation on the signal (as
explained in (Schmid, 2006)), and feed the resulting stream of chips into
a correlating receiver that detects a SHR on the channel accurately. Once
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a SFD is detected, an interrupt is triggered at the programmable interrupt
controller. Our detector adds a 4 µs delay after the SFD because of the time
needed for correlation.
7.4. Subsystem: Decision
The decision subsystem is pivotal to support a selective operation, and en-
suring that devices in the vicinity are protected by WiFire.
Rule decision
The decision system is triggered via interrupts by the packet framer when a
pre-defined point in the packet is reached (e.g., when the full link layer header
is available) to trigger the decision process on whether the packet should be
blocked; it classifies incoming packets according to a pre-defined policy. It is
the critical component for real-time operation because the overall response
time mainly depends on its execution time. Therefore, we implemented two
different versions: (i) firmware code written in C and running on the USRP2’s
(soft-) micro-controller, which offers runtime reconfigurability but is compar-
atively slow, and (ii) an implementation in FPGA logic that reduces the
response time, but the security policy must be specified at compile time. In
both implementations, the rule checker notifies the interference subsystem
via interrupts that a short burst of interference must now be generated to
destroy a malicious packet. The firmware-based rule checker allows to define
content-based rules in the style of iptables, defining rule chains that consist
of one or more rules, each with zero or more matches (such as source or des-
tination address). We implemented a command line tool (wftables), which
generates a data structure that can be directly interpreted by the firmware
rule checker. This mechanism allows to define complex access policies and to
deploy them on the distributed WiFire guardians. The FPGA rule checker
uses hardware gates to compare detected packet bytes to a table of predefined
values in parallel, such that the execution time is considerably reduced.
7.5. Detection Evaluation
This part of the evaluation is concerned with the speed and precision of the
packet detection subsystem. A correct operation is crucial because only de-
tected packets are classified (and destroyed if necessary). We evaluate the
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Figure 7.2.: Receiver sensitivity, detection performance: packet reception ra-
tio with increasing distance. The guardian shows a better sensi-
tivity, allowing to protect sensor motes from a distance.
guardian’s ability to detect packets correctly while varying the distance be-
tween attacker and guardian (dag). Due to path loss, the signal strength
gradually reduces, making it harder to distinguish signal from noise. As refer-
ence, we compare the performance of a standard-compliant MICAz receiver
in this experiment to observe if the sensitivity of the guardian is better than
that of the motes in the protected network.
Experimental methodology
The receiver under test (either guardian or MICAz mote) is placed at a fixed
position at one end of the experimentation area, a 3m wide hallway. This
indoor scenario is a challenging test for the receiver because multipath effects
and inter-symbol-interference (ISI) increase the difficulty to detect signals
correctly. The guardian runs on a USRP2 with an XCVR2450 transceiver and
omni-directional antennas (3 dBi gain). The attacker is a MICAz mote with
its default antenna, using its maximum output power (0 dBm) to transmit
100 packets/s (which contain 48 symbols and have a duration of 768µs) for
10 s.
Starting from a 1m attacker–receiver distance, we then move the attacker
to a set of measurement positions with distances dag = 1, . . . , 30m. For
each position, the attacker transmits 1,000 broadcast packets. The receiver
(guardian or MICAz) counts the successfully detected packets (confirmed by
a CRC check) for the packet reception ratio.
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Results
The detection results are shown in Figure 7.2. The COTS receiver performs
well in this experiment, with a detection radius of approximately 20 meters.
With 12 out of 20,000 packets in this range, only a limited number of packets
was not received successfully. Our FPGA-based receiver implementation has
an increased reception radius (up to 25m), indicating a higher sensitivity
compared to the MICAz mote. However, the performance for longer distances
deteriorates slightly because the receiver is sensitive to multipath fading
effects, causing a fraction of packets to be missed in some locations. We
mitigate this effect by using a second guardian. In this setup, the number
of missed packets is again reduced. Overall, the system fulfills the goal of a
better receiver sensitivity discussed in the WiFire evaluation, such that the
guardians are suitable to protect sensor nodes from a distance.
7.6. Decision Subsystem Evaluation
By reaction delay treact, we refer to the time from receiving the content bytes
of interest until the interference is finished. This delay affects how deep the
guardian can look into a packet, because the interference must overlap with
it. It is mainly dependent on the execution time tdecide of the guardian rule
checker to decide whether the packet should be destroyed. An overly slow
decision process may shift the selective interference behind the end of the
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packet. We put both firmware and FPGA-based rule checker to the test.
Experimental methodology
The measurements are taken using the FPGA’s 100MHz internal clock to
record timestamps, which allows us to reach a timing precision of 10 ns. The
rule evaluation is timed from the instant a hardware interrupt signals the
detection of an ieee .. header by the framer to the instant the rule
system returns a verdict on how to treat the packet. In the firmware-based
rule system, this is the return of the C function call that activates the rule
checker. For the FPGA-based rule checker, the timestamp is taken when the
rule checker interrupt to start the interference arrives in the firmware.
We vary the number of rules in the chain, and the number of matches in
each rule (each match is a C function that reads data from the framer and
compares these values to constants stored in the chain). The rules are chosen
such that none of them matches the packet, hence we measure the worst-case
run time where the chain is traversed completely. As the rules are evaluated
in parallel in the FPGA-based implementation, increasing the rule set size
affects the FPGA resource usage and not the timing.
Firmware-based rule checker results
The compound execution times depicted in Figure 7.3 show that the reaction
delay is depending on the rule set used. The reason is that our implementa-
tion follows the general design of iptables using linked lists with variable
size, such that a small overhead occurs for the evaluation of each rule chain,
rule, and the matches contained in a rule to traverse the list. As the used
micro-controller only supports a single thread, the required execution time
is deterministic but increasing with each rule.
To break the delays into components, we analyzed the rule checker im-
plementation in depth. First, a constant time of 4.03 µs is needed to enter
the interrupt handler, jump into the rule checker and back, and trigger the
interference process. This cost is independent of the chain’s contents and is
paid for each detected packet. To evaluate one rule in the chain, the guardian
needs 0.26 µs for evaluation (mainly the time to traverse the chain). Evaluat-
ing the time needed for individual rule, each match needs 0.34 µs to start the
execution of the associated test function. The overall running time of a match
function depends on the logic of the match itself. Considering the address
match, a match with representative complexity, the execution takes 1.86 µs
before the function returns. All matches in a rule are checked sequentially,
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Figure 7.4.: Reaction time tinit of the jammer.
such that the execution times add up. For example, the execution of one
rule with 3 matches accounts to 5.58 µs. So, when considering a chain with
20 rules of 3 matches each, the guardian requires 116µs or approximately 4
payload bytes to react in the worst case (when all rules are traversed).
FPGA-based rule checker results
To allow more deterministic decision delays and to support a deeper look into
the packet, we also implemented a rule checker implemented in FPGA logic
that is less flexible but provides faster reaction times. Using this approach we
are able to cut the latency down to a limited number of FPGA clock cycles,
i.e., below one microsecond up to 10 µs. This enables us to achieve an overall
reaction time of tresponse = 39 µs, even with complex rule sets. This means
that the guardian can base its decision on the complete payload and still hit
the CRC bytes at the end of the packet to cause a packet drop.
7.7. Overall System Response Time
First, we determine the jamming initialization time after a packet is detected
(tinit). More precision enables a “surgical” jamming where we can operate
on a (sub-) symbol level. Further, we evaluate whether the firmware-based
approach with its indeterministic timing is sufficient for our strict timing
requirements. For this experiment, we place a MICAz mote close to the RX
antenna of the jammer and start detecting its transmissions. The jammer
schedules a jamming request as soon as an SFD is detected and initiates
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the transmission of the jamming signal. Using a second USRP2, we monitor
and collect samples from the channel and measure the time from the end of
the SFD and the beginning of the jamming signal. We use power envelope
detection to identify the start of the packet and the start of the jamming
signal; the resulting tinit is the elapsed time between these two events, minus
4 µs from the detector.
The empirical CDF (ECDF) of the experimental results is shown in Fig-
ure 7.4. We observe a delay of tinit = 14.4 µs on average, which is mainly
caused by the firmware latency. For the summary of delay components, the
RX/TX turnaround from the daughterboard accounts for 1 µs, a small number
of FPGA cycles is spent in the TX DSP pipeline, the rest (and the devia-
tions) is caused by the interrupt handling and the additional processing in
the firmware.
We proceed by evaluating the system response time tresponse achieved by
WiFire. As a reference value, if we want to read the complete payload and
perform the classification and selective interference during the checksum at
the end of the packet, this time must be less than 64 µs. The results of our
evaluation are shown in Figure 7.3. For the firmware-based rule checker, the
delay depends on the number and complexity of rules to be checked. The
response time for a representative rule set is 160µs, or 5 byte before the end
of the packet. For the FPGA implementation, the execution time is much
shorter: even with a complex rule set, the response time does not exceed 39 µs.
This enables rules using the complete packet payload and still ensures the
destruction of the packet.
7.8. Summary
The guardian implementation allows real-time detection of malicious packets
with a high accuracy during their transmission and a reliable destruction
before the packet may arrive at a receiver. The results are summarized in
Tables 7.1 and 7.2. The system is able to classify and destroy 99.9% of the
packets, even if the classification depends on the last byte in the payload,
because the reaction time of the system (39 µs) is shorter than the duration
of the CRC field (64 µs).
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Blocking rule Offset Maximum Firmware FPGA
(bytes) tresponse (µs)
Start-of-Frame Delim. 5 864
√ √
Frame Control Field 7–8 768
√ √
Source Address 14–15 544
√ √
Payload byte #16 27 160
√ √
Last payload byte 30 64 × √
Table 7.1.: Impact of overall reaction delay on feasible blocking rules. The
symbol
√
indicates that the guardian can use the respective block-
ing rule and still destroy the packet.
Delay (µs)
Parameter Description Firmware FPGA
tdecide Rule checker execution time (var.) 116 10
tinit Duration decision–start transmitting 3 3
tinterfere Interference duration for packet drop 26 26
tresponse Overall reaction delay 145 39
Table 7.2.: Time parameters of our guardian implementation, indicating that
packets can still be destroyed after observing a large part of their
contents.
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8.1. Validation of the Collision Model
To show the validity and accuracy of our model presented in Chapter 4, we
implemented and experimented with an application that is strongly dependent
on physical layer characteristics, the reception of unsynchronized signals. We
performed this experiment with two widely used commercial ieee ..
receiver implementations (TI CC2420 and Atmel AT86RF230) to demonstrate
that our results are receiver-independent. The results validate our claim that
our model accurately captures the behavior of realistic receivers in the face
of concurrent transmissions.
Here, we provide experimental evidence that our model accurately captures
the behavior of existing receiver implementations. We focus our efforts on
the reception of interfering signals because this topic is not well covered
experimentally in the literature. We note that we also validated our analytical
results with a simulation model based on the numerical integration of time-
discrete signals, which confirmed the correctness of our model at the symbol
and chip levels. The purpose of this section is to show that our simplifying
assumptions, especially for the receiver model, are justified.
8.1.1. Experimental Setup
To perform this experiment, the requirements for the interferer differ from
the scope of operation of Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) devices. We
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need to (i) transmit arbitrary symbols on the physical layer, without restric-
tions like PHY headers, (ii) synchronize to ongoing transmissions with high
accuracy, and (iii) schedule transmissions at a fine time granularity. To meet
these requirements, we implemented a custom software-defined radio based
experimental system.
Interferer Implementation
To this end, we modified WiFire to recover the timing of the other signal and
send arbitrary ieee .. symbols at controlled time offsets. Because of its
implementation in the USRP2’s FPGA, the system is able to tune the start
of transmission with a granularity of 10 ns and send arbitrary waveforms.
Experimental Methodology
In our experiments, we consider three parties in the network: a standard-
compliant receiver (we monitor the behavior of two implementations to test for
hardware dependencies, Atmel AT86RF230 and TI CC2420), a synchronized
sender S (a COTS RZ Raven USB), and the interferer I described above. The
procedure is as follows: S sends a packet with PHY headers, MAC header,
and 8 byte payload. I time-synchronizes with this signal and schedules the
transmission of 8 different bytes at the beginning of the payload of S. The
receiver first synchronizes on S and receives its header, but experiences a
collision in the payload bits. We note that the receivers do not attempt to
correct bit errors, retransmissions are used for error recovery during normal
operation. Damaged packets are simply detected using the checksum at the
end and discarded in case of failure. For the experiments we reconfigured the
devices so that all packets are recorded, even if the checksums did not match.
We chose values of τ in (−1.5T ; 1.5T ) or ±750 ns in steps of 10 ns; for each
time offset τ , we sent 1,000 packets and analyzed the payload detected by
the receiver. We derived the value of τ empirically, i.e., we chose the point
with maximum PRR in the center as τ = 0. We adjusted the transmit power
of I to result in a SIR of −40 dB to be in the region of interest.
8.1.2. Experimental Results
We analyze our measurements using two metrics, packet reception ratio and
symbol error rate.
102
8.1. Validation of the Collision Model
−1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
Time offset τ (/T )
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pa
ck
et
re
ce
pt
io
n
ra
tio
(P
R
R
)
Model
AT86RF230
CC2420
(a) Comparison of packet reception ratios.
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(b) Comparison of PRR standard deviations.
Figure 8.1.: Experimental results for two receivers in terms of packet recep-
tion (PRR) performance and PRR standard deviation compared
to our model. Both receivers display a behavior that is well-
described by the model.
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Packet reception ratio (PRR)
Based on the received packet data from the experiments, we derive the PRR
as the number of packets with correct payload (of the interferer) divided
by the total number of packets. In other words, we measure the empirical
success probability for a message manipulation attack. The experimental
results for the mean PRR of the two receivers are shown in Figure 8.1a.
We observe a good fit with the predictions of our model to both receivers,
Atmel AT86RF230 and TI CC2420. In the central region, the receivers show
a slightly better ability to receive the interfering signal than predicted by our
analytical model. The reason is that our model makes the assumption that no
frequency offset is present and that the receiver does not try to resynchronize
with a stronger signal. However, receivers must be able to tolerate frequency
offsets of up to 100 kHz (IEEE Std 802.15.4 2006, Sec. 6.9.4) and thus track
and possibly correct the phase during the packet reception process. Yet, as
the results show, our assumptions still yield a good approximation of the real
receiver behavior.
To further validate our model, we perform an analysis of the standard
deviation of the measured PRR values (Figure 8.1b). In general, the second
order statistics follow the non-trivial shape well. On closer inspection, we
observe three regions in the graph. For |τ | < 0.5, our model slightly overes-
timates the standard deviation; the reason is that the PRR performance of
the COTS receivers is better than our model, leading to less variance. For
0.5 < |τ | < 1.1, the curves are close to each other. Finally, in the zone with
|τ | > 1.1, the model slightly underestimates the standard deviation, again
because the real receivers perform better than the model predicts. Still, the
model provides a good approximation of the behavior of widely used receivers
for interfering signals under the assumption of random carrier phase offsets.
Symbol error rate (SER)
We derive the SER by summation of the number of symbol errors across the
payload of all received packets for a given time offset τ , and divide this sum
by the total number of payload symbols. This metric gives better insights into
the causes for packet errors, and provides another validation for the capture
zone. In Figure 8.2a, we observe that the fit is good for the symbol error rate
as well, with a slightly better SER performance for the COTS receivers as
expected. Considering the SER standard deviation (Figure 8.2b), we observe
a similar behavior as in the PRR case, the predictions of the model and the
measured results provide a good fit in both, curve shape and absolute values.
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(a) Comparison of symbol error rates.
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(b) Comparison of SER standard deviations.
Figure 8.2.: Comparison of experimentally measured symbol error rates and
standard deviations, and the SER values predicted by our model.
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8.1.3. Concurrent Transmissions Summary
Our results show that our analysis of packet collisions in ieee .. net-
works shows a good fit to the experimental results of several widely used
receivers.
8.2. Experimental Evaluation of Jamming
With WiFire, we can deliberately produce collisions between the packet in
transmission and a jamming signal. Depending on the error correction ca-
pabilities of the standard, only a small fraction of a packet must actually
be destroyed to make the packet unrecoverable, resulting in a drop at the
receiver. We are interested in the optimal waveform that offers a high chance
to intercept a packet, and the minimum interference duration that introduces
bit errors into the packet with high probability. We identify the factors that
influence the jamming performance, and select the optimal jamming signal.
In this section, we identify the causes of packet loss on the physical layer of
ieee .., as well as which jamming signals and timings are consequently
the most effective ones against such transmissions. The results are verified
through systematic experiments in a WSN testbed with MICAz motes.
8.2.1. Effectiveness of Jamming Waveforms
Based on our analyzes in Chapters 4 and 5, we want to identify jamming
waveforms that are the most effective against ieee ... By waveform,
we refer to the shape of the RF signal transmitted on the channel, specified
by a sequence of I/Q samples. We check the susceptibility to three different
jamming waveforms that trigger the causes presented in the previous sec-
tion: symbol, timing, and frame sync errors. The signals we consider are (i)
wideband noise, (ii) a narrowband continuous wave (single-tone jamming),
and (iii) ieee .. modulated signals with different content, such as ran-
dom symbols, preambles or SFDs to interfere with the PHY packet reception
process.
Experimental Setting
We conduct the experiments in a room with a surface area of 4 m× 3 m, with
two MICAz motes programmed as sender and receiver placed at 2 m apart,
and a USRP2 as the jammer in the same room. The USRP2 is equipped with
an XCRV2450 board with a maximum transmit power of 100 mW (20 dBm),
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and 3 dBi omnidirectional antennas. The jamming waveforms are generated
on a host PC using GNU Radio. We use constant jamming and deactivate
the clear channel assessment functionality of the sender such that it transmits
irrespective of the channel state to ensure that we only observe physical layer
effects. We do not use reactive jamming at this point because this would
introduce new uncertainties into the experiment, however, the results also
apply to reactive jamming. We vary the transmission power of the jammer
(denoted as jammer gain) and measure the resulting PRR at the receiver,
i.e., packets that successfully passed the CRC check despite jamming. The
main factor of successful jamming is a sufficiently high power level at the
receiver, e.g., by using external amplification. Alternatively, we can say that
the jammer has an operational range that is defined by the selected output
power, and influenced by the propagation environment and transmission delay.
Jamming Waveforms
We concentrate on physical layer attacks against 802.15.4 instead of jamming
approaches against MAC mechanisms (Law et al., 2009; Lin and Noubir,
2005) such as attacking the clear channel assessment (CCA). We evaluated
three candidate waveforms for their ability to prevent a packet reception:
a continuous wave (CW) positioned at the center frequency of the channel,
white noise with a bandwidth of 500 kHz around the center frequency, and
random symbols spread and modulated as specified in ieee ... We
evaluated their performance according to the required transmit power to
achieve a packet reception ratio of 0%. We generated the modulated signals
using the UCLA ZigBee implementation (Schmid, 2006).
Results for ieee .. Modulated Waveforms
We evaluated five patterns: random symbols, preamble (0x00), SFD (0xA7),
synchronization header SHR (preamble+SFD), and SHR+PHR headers (pream-
ble+SFD+length). Each of the sequences has a different effect on the receiver.
Random symbols interfere with the symbol recognition and can therefore flip
symbols (Figure 8.4). We expected the preamble or SFD symbols to interfere
with the timing recovery, but these two waveforms are comparable to random
symbols in their jamming efficiency. The reason is that the receiver locks onto
stronger preambles (the capture effect), and that SFDs without preambles
are not detected by the receiver because of lacking timing recovery.
Network degradations with weaker jamming transmissions are observed
for the SHR and SHR+PHR waveforms. The receiver can lock onto such
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Figure 8.3.: Waveforms interfering with timing recovery and frame synchro-
nization.
jamming signals even if they are weaker than the legitimate signal. Thus,
even with a smaller jammer power a severe reduction in the PRR is possible
as the receiver is busy decoding noise (see the comparison in Figure 8.3).
This effect can be amplified further through the use of a valid length field
after the SFD, forcing the receiver to stay longer in the reception state. For a
proactive jammer this attack is attractive, because even weak signals at the
receiver can still cause severe reductions in the PRR.
Results for Simple Jamming Waveforms
We used two different uncorrelated waveforms for jamming in addition to the
modulated jamming, continuous (sine) waves and noise, see Figure 8.4.
Single-tone jamming. We used a constant signal that is modulated on
the carrier, resulting in a continuous wave in passband. This very narrow-
band signal may be expected to perform badly as only a small portion of
the ieee .. channel bandwidth is affected (see also Poisel (2011) for
in-depth results on CW jamming). However, several effects cause a superior
jamming efficiency in our experiments: in Figure 8.4, this waveform possesses
a clear γSIR advantage over modulated jamming. First, this waveform in-
terferes with timing recovery, the receiver detects the jamming signal as a
second carrier signal, and the frequency mismatch makes a phase correction
impossible. The second effect is that it has the largest signal amplitude of
the tested waveforms; it provides more power per Hertz with a limited power
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Figure 8.4.: Impact of waveforms that interfere with the symbol decision.
budget as the signal is more concentrated on the channel. This causes AGC
to react faster, which results in chip misdetection on smaller power levels
in comparison to other jamming waveforms. So despite its simplicity and
ineffectiveness in theory, this waveform offers the best performance against
COTS devices that are not hardened against jamming attacks.
Noise jamming. Wideband interference is always present in wireless com-
munications, such that the receivers are specifically designed to withstand
its influence. Its main effect is chip flipping that increases the likelihood of
symbol misdetection. However, for a limited power budget (e.g., 20 dBm for
the USRP2) the jamming signal’s power is spread over a wider spectrum,
depending on the bandwidth of the signal. This is the main factor why noise
jamming has a limited efficiency in our tests; we achieved the best results
with a BW of 500 kHz, yet it was always a few dB less efficient in comparison
to single-tone jamming to achieve a PRR of 0%.
Jamming Waveform Summary
The continuous wave offers the most energy-efficient way to interfere with
reception against the sensor platform we use, with the additional benefits that
it is easy to generate on the SDR and that co-existing technologies such as
WLAN filter out this type of interference relatively well, hence their operation
is not disturbed by the wireless firewall.
109
8. Jamming Evaluation
−2.0 −1.5 −1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
Frequency offset of jammer from center frequency (/MHz)
−5
0
5
10
15
20
Ja
m
m
in
g-
to
-s
ig
na
lr
at
io
JS
R
(/
dB
)
Figure 8.5.: Impact of relative position of the tone jamming signals in the
channel. Relative jamming power required to ensure a PRR of
0% for the receiver.
8.2.2. Effect of the Center Frequency on Jamming
Performance
The relative position of the tone in the channel is also an important factor. We
experimented with different offset values from the channel’s center frequency,
and the results are shown in Figure 8.5.1 We observe that the channel filter
of the MICAz transceiver has a width of 3 MHz, which cancels out-of-band
interference. Additionally, a jamming signal directly on the center frequency
is less effective in comparison to a 1 MHz frequency offset (on the corner
frequency of the modulation), which complies with results in the literature
(Poisel, 2011). Surprisingly, this effect is not symmetric. Negative frequency
shifts have a 3 dB higher tolerance to CW jamming than positive shifts.
We can only speculate why this is the case, but an artifact from either the
USRP2’s behavior (nonlinearities in the transmitter chain) or the receiver
chip are potential explanations.
8.2.3. Minimum Interference Duration
We first evaluate how long WiFire must hit a packet to successfully destroy
it. Using the CW waveform, we evaluated the minimum interference duration
1Note that the measurements result from a different experimental setup and the jammer
gain values are not directly comparable to the other results.
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Figure 8.6.: Minimum interference duration for ieee .. radios, inter-
fering with 26 µs of a packet transmission is sufficient to trigger
packet drops at the receiver reliably.
tminjam on the channel to reliably destroy a packet with jamming.
Setup
Two MICAz motes are programmed as sender and receiver. To ensure that
the jamming duration is the only factor in this performance measurement, the
receiver is placed close to the jammer’s TX antenna. Thus, WiFire and victim
are placed in close vicinity such that the WiFire’s interference is stronger than
the signal of each packet. For each jam duration we consider, we transmit
100 packets and measure the PRR at the receiver, with 10 repetitions each.
We use a single-tone, continuous wave as the jamming waveform.
Results
The results in Figure 8.6 show (with 95% confidence intervals for the PRR
means) that an interference duration of 26 µs is sufficient to destroy a packet.
In theory, the destruction of a single symbol (16 µs) should be enough to
cause a dropping probability of 93.75% (there is still a 1 in 16 chance that
the correct symbol is chosen), but due to symbol misalignments we require
a slightly longer jamming duration to ensure interference with a complete
symbol. This result has three implications: first, the energy cost of the attacker
is high; while the attacker must transmit a complete packet to be successful
(e.g., 1024µs for a 32 byte packet), the wireless firewall invests 40 times less
energy to successfully prevent the reception. Second, the interference duty
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cycle of the wireless firewall is very low, minimizing the effect on co-existing
networks. This is a critical point for real-world deployments of WiFire. From
the view of a single channel, WiFire’s behavior is comparable to frequency
hopping systems such as Bluetooth. In fact, Bluetooth Power Class 1 devices
(ieee ..(2005, Sec. 7.2)) use the same transmit power (100mW) as
WiFire and occupy a 2MHz ieee .. channel for approximately 25ms
per second, which is comparable to the emissions of WiFire reacting to an
attacker with maximum rate (1,000 packets/s). This shows that WiFire can
effectively control the wireless channel while using very limited emissions,
comparable to licensed devices. Third, we are able to observe large parts of a
packet because tresponse is small enough to observe the complete payload and
still reliably destroy the packet.
8.2.4. Jamming Summary
Considering reactive jamming, ieee .. modulated symbols are not as
effective, since the receiver is already locked on the transmission. Due to
the design choices of the transceiver in the MICAz sensor motes, single-tone
jamming proves more efficient for reactive jamming than actual ieee ..
waveforms with a limited power budget. This waveform reliably jams trans-
missions of the sensor motes in our experiments, and it is easily generated
in software. The most efficient placement of the tone is at 1 MHz above the
center frequency of the channel. Our results show that a jamming duration of
26 µs is sufficient to cause a packet loss in ieee ... This very selective
and precise jamming minimizes the impact on co-existing networks nearby.
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9.1. Evaluation of the Protection Coefficient
In this chapter, we want to evaluate the spatial protection performance using
controlled experiments in various environments. We focus on the brute force
attacker. The main factors are the two key distances:
• the distance from attacker to a victim node dav, which governs the
attack signal power at the victims antenna, and
• the distance from guardian to victim dgv, which governs the protection
signal power at the victims antenna.
We derived the results in our protection analysis in Chapter 5.1. We have
established, for the brute force attacker
dav ≤ α
√
Pa
γSIRPg
dgv.
This means that for a successful attack, the attacker has to position itself
closer than ρdgv to the victim to succeed, with the factor ρ = α
√
Pa
γSIRPg
being
the protection coefficient. From the point of view of the protection system, we
have to increase the value of ρ such that the attack condition is not met. In
a numerical example in 5.10, we calculated a value of ρ ≈ 0.07 for a realistic
setting (i.e., the attacker must be 14.2 times closer than WiFire to succeed),
however this applied under worst case assumptions and with a simplified
fading model. The goal of this section is to evaluate the protection factor in
realistic settings.
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9.1.1. Experimental Setup and Methodology
This section describes the setup of this extended measurement campaign that
was carried out over several days. We first describe the methodology that
puts the distances as the primary parameters of the experiment, and enables
us to analyze the effect of various distance combinations. Additionally, we
are interested in the effects of realistic fading, which leads to the choice of
several indoor and outdoor scenarios.
Setup
There are three parties that take part in the experiments: a group of ten
sensor motes under attack, an attacker mote, and two guardian devices. The
attacker and victim devices are placed in a straight line with a distance of
10 cm between devices, the attacker being in the middle of the line. This
setup leads to pairs of victim devices with a distance of 10 cm, 20 cm, . . . ,
50 cm from the attacker. Stated differently, we vary dav from 10 cm to 50 cm,
which implies that the power of the attacker is affected by channel fading
only by a very limited amount. The attack device is a MICAz sensor mote
with a power output of 1mW.
Methodology
The experiment is performed as follows: the attacker broadcasts 1,000 pack-
ets to all victims simultaneously for each position, which are logged by the
victims individually on reception. This means that, in the unprotected case,
all devices observe the same packet count, and the attack is a complete suc-
cess. To provide protection, a group of two WiFire guardian devices is placed
in the vicinity of the setup, with varying distances from 1m to 30m, and
programmed to intercept all incoming attack packets with a power of 100mW.
In terms of the protection factor ρ, this leads to a dynamic range of this
parameter in the experiment from ρ = 0.003 for the combination dav = 10 cm
and dgv = 30m, up to a value of ρ = 0.5 for the combination of dav = 0.5m
and dgv = 1m.
Locations used
The variation of distances used in the experiments captures the effects of path
loss, which is also covered in our protection analysis. However, in realistic
environments the effects of short-term fading effects like multipath fading
plays in important role as well, as we have seen in the experiments in the
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previous chapters. To evaluate the effects that these important transmission
properties play, we repeat the same experiment in several realistic settings,
namely (i) corridor, (ii), gymnasium, (iii) sports field, and (iv) underground
tunnel; all on the premises of the TU Kaiserlautern. We briefly describe the
environments and the predicted effects of fading to system performance.
Corridor: This setting constitutes a standard office environment with con-
crete walls, office doors, windows, etc. While we ensure that line of sight con-
nections exist between all devices, this indoor scenario includes non-negligible
multipath fading components with a large number of reflecting surfaces. Be-
cause multipath fading has an adverse effect to the performance of WiFire,
this scenario is considered to be challenging both to the reception and de-
struction of the attack packets. This is also the scenario that was used for
the experimental results in the other parts of this work.
Gymnasium: This large sports hall is another representative indoor sce-
nario. It is a single large room with a high ceiling and large area. We chose
this setup because the connections are predominantly line of sight, with only
a limited number of reflecting surfaces and thus only a few multipath compo-
nents. This scenario should lead to protection results that are more favorable
to WiFire, and protection in this scenario should also behave closer to the
analytical model.
Outdoor sports field: We perform measurements on a large outdoor area
with very few reflecting surfaces in the vicinity. Consequently, this scenario
should lead to the most favorable protection results, with predominant line
of sight connections (and possibly two-ray ground reflections). The results
should offer the most straightforward comparison to the analytical results.
Maintenance tunnels: Finally, we perform our experiments in a several
meters deep underground tunnel. Tunnels are known to have very adverse
effects to wireless transmissions because of multipath effects, and we use this
scenario to evaluate protection performance in the worst case. We stress that
a protection from WiFire is generally not necessary in these settings because
the tunnels offer an extremely good physical protection from attacks; we are
aiming to establish a better understanding of the adverse effects of multipath
fading, and the limitations of the analytical model.
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9.1.2. Experimental Results
We performed several large measurement campaigns to evaluate the spatial
protection performance of WiFire.
Corridor Scenario
In the indoor corridor environment, we performed the experiment twice to
get a feeling for stability of the experiments. The results from these two
runs are shown in Figure 9.1. We observe that both runs yield very similar
results, thus we only performed a single measurement campaign for the other
scenarios.
Interpretation of the Hinton plots: The interpretation of these plots
is as follows: on the x-axis, we show the distance of the victim nodes from
the attacker in the center. For example, the attacker has two neighboring
devices with a distance of 10 cm, both to the left and right of it. Overall,
there are ten columns for each victim node, with pairs of nodes that have the
same distance from the center. This also implies that the graphs should be
symmetrical at the center position under a simple path loss model, because
the distances in each direction are the same. Additionally, the graph should
have a V-shape, because the attacker is affected by more severe path loss for
larger dav distances, resulting in a better protection performance of WiFire.
In each column, a number of boxes is shown. Each box shows the packet
reception performance for a certain WiFire–victim distance dgv. Figure 9.1
shows that dgv was varied from 1m to 23m in this set of experiments. Finally,
the surface area of each box indicates the packet reception rate for packets
that were sent from the attacker. A large surface area indicates a small PRR
of the victim, i.e., an effective protection from WiFire. For PRR values below
5%, the surface area of the boxes is shown in black to support the visual
impression of the areas of effective protection.
To analyze the protection coefficient ρ, we find the steepest line from the
center that only has black boxes below. This line and the area below is
shown in red in the figures. The intuition that we want to identify a set of
dav, dgv pairs that always ensure a successful protection. Because of the linear
relationship dav = ρdgv for successful protection, we can infer the minimal
value of ρ that is supported by WiFire in this fashion by analyzing the slope.
Results: In the corridor scenario, we observe that a slope for ρ can indeed
be found. The results follow the V-shape, and an area of good protection
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(a) Run 1. The experimental protection coefficient is ρ = 0.042.
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(b) Run 2. The experimental protection coefficient is ρ = 0.042.
Figure 9.1.: Disco corridor results.
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can be identified when the WiFire distance dgv is below 12m. In this case,
we derive for an attacker distance of 50 cm the protection coefficient of ρ =
0.5m/12m = 0.0417. When we compare this value to the predictions from
the analysis (ρ = 0.07), we observe that the protection characteristics of
WiFire are more favorable in realistic experiments. The reason is that the
analysis only considers the worst case layout, with the attacker being as far
away from WiFire as possible. In realistic environments, this is not always
the case. However, with these experiments we established that the protection
coefficient exists, raising the hope that this factor can be used to help in the
operation of remote protection systems such as WiFire.
Looking closer at the results, we note that the protection coefficient could
be even more favorable, with good protection results even up to 23m for
the larger values of dav. However, there are a limited number of distance
combinations that lead to imperfect protection, e.g., for dav = −0.5m and
dgv = 13m, with a considerable PRR for the attacker. Surprisingly, the
protection is again very favorable for dgv = 14m, an effect that is not captured
in the analytical model. The explanation for this observation is that multipath
fading has an adverse effect on the performance of WiFire for certain spatial
constellations that are not only governed by the distances between devices.
An illustrative example is the bad protection performance at the distances
of 17m and 20m. While the protection is still favorable for larger WiFire
distances, these gaps show that an attacker can find certain positions that
allow an attack. Therefore the deployment of WiFire should be conservative
in scenarios with multipath fading.
Gymnasium Scenario
We repeated the experiment in the large sports hall scenario. The results
of this experiments are shown in Figure 9.2. We observe that the V-shape
is even more pronounced, the reduced amount of multipath fading reduces
the spots with weak protection results. However, a small number of weak
constellations at 11m to 15m imply that a maximum distance of 13m should
be used in this scenario as well, resulting in the comparable of ρ as given in
the corridor scenario.
Outdoor Sports Field
As expected, the outdoor field scenario results in the most regular results and
consistent protection results for most constellations (the results are shown
in Figure 9.3). Positions with reduced protection for the distances of 40 cm
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Figure 9.2.: Sports hall indoor. ρ = 0.02
and 50 cm are still the the PRR area of 90–95%. These results validate that
the analytical model is suitable to analyze the protection offered by WiFire,
and that the protection coefficient can be used for both scenarios with and
without small-scale fading effects.
Service Tunnels
In the final experiment, we evaluate the system performance in the face of the
most severe multipath fading effects in the underground tunnel experiment.
The results are shown in Figure 9.4. As expected, the results are comparable
to the results in the corridor, but the number of constellations with insufficient
protection is strongly increased. In consequence, WiFire must be deployed
very closely to the protected devices, in a distance of approximately 4m in
this experiment.
The conclusion from this extreme example is that a protection from WiFire
is still possible with the right deployment, but multipath fading has an adverse
effect on the protection performance, i.e., increasing the distance an attacker
can have from the victim devices.
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Figure 9.3.: Sports field outdoor. ρ = 0.02
9.1.3. Summary
In this section, we showed experimentally that a protection coefficient can
indeed be found, that it is a good measure to gauge the increase of protection
that WiFire offers. If a minimum possible distance of an attacker can be
guaranteed, the concept of remote access control can be used to ensure the
security of devices in the vicinity of guardian devices.
9.2. Selectivity Experiments
The experiments in this section show that WiFire operates selectively, i.e.,
communication from co-existing networks is not affected.
Scenario
As a scenario, we consider node capture and replication attacks in WSNs
(Parno et al., 2005). While this problem is mainly treated as a key man-
agement issue in the literature (Chan et al., 2005; Parno et al., 2005), we
show that compromised sensor motes can also be removed on the physical
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Figure 9.4.: Underground tunnels. ρ = 0.1
layer once they are identified. We refer to this as instant revocation because
once the blocking rules are committed to the guardian, the motes’ channel
access is instantaneously blocked and they are thus disconnected from the
network; it is not necessary to reliably distribute a revocation command in
the (possibly Byzantine) network. From the guardian’s perspective, the chan-
nel control policy is to detect packets from revoked nodes by their source
addresses (sensors 0x1111 (I1), 0x1112 (I3), 0x1115 (I5)) and network ID
(0xACAC) and to destroy those packets:
wftables -A -m src --addr 0x1111 --pan 0xACAC -j DROP
wftables -A -m src --addr 0x1112 --pan 0xACAC -j DROP
wftables -A -m src --addr 0x1115 --pan 0xACAC -j DROP
In this experiment, six MICAz motes consecutively start transmitting with
10 packets/s. After 70 seconds, three nodes are revoked for 90 seconds, then
allowed again for 20 seconds, and finally revoked for the rest of the experiment.
We are interested in packets from revoked nodes able to reach the network
(false negatives) and the impact of the guardian on the legitimate traffic (false
positives).
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Sensors
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Sensors
Figure 9.5.: Central node revocation of three MICAz motes enforced by
WiFire in a network consisting of six motes. After 70 seconds,
WiFire is configured to selectively block traffic transmitted from
revoked devices (3 motes).
Results
The results are shown in Figure 9.5. The stepwise traffic increase is due to the
consecutive start of the transmissions. The black solid line is the cumulative
traffic of the nodes to be revoked, the dashed line shows the traffic of legitimate
nodes, and the overall traffic is depicted by the bars in the background. As
can be seen, the guardian immediately reacts by completely blocking the
traffic from the revoked nodes. During the revocation phases, the amount
of legitimate traffic equals the overall traffic, so there are no false positives.
The number of false negatives is one packet at the beginning and at the
end of revocation phases (due to the transition of the guardian’s rule re-
configuration).
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This chapter discusses additional analyzers, and technical and non-technical
considerations when applying a selective jamming system for wireless access
control.
10.1. Additional Options for Rules
The current system implementation supports classification based on the con-
tent of the packet, such that certain types of attacks (spoofing and replay
attacks) are hard to single out. In these cases, an attacker uses the same
packet contents that a legitimate devices would use, and all content-based
rules would block legitimate transmissions as well. Thus, the limitation to
content-based policies limits the application scenarios that can be solved with
the wireless firewall concept.
However, packet contents are not the only feature extractable from in-
coming packets: the physical characteristics of a signal are influenced by RF
propagation phenomena and transmitter characteristics. There is a wide range
of additional physical features that can increase the attack detection options
of our guardian system. The physical characteristics of wireless communi-
cation could actually be exploited to provide interesting new opportunities
for security policies, e.g., restricting communication based on the received
signal strength, the angle of arrival of a transmission, the particular radio
technology, or the physical device fingerprint. We briefly introduce a selection
of features considered in the literature.
10.1.1. Positioning
Energy-based positioning. Several methods to infer a sender’s position
are proposed in the literature. The use of power level information such as RSS
is used to position devices precisely (Bahl and Padmanabhan, 2000), even
to localize them in large scenarios (Haeberlen et al., 2004). This enables
location-aware applications such as geo-fencing (Sheth et al., 2009). The
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Layers Filtering criteria
application content
transport source/destination port, flags, protocol
network source IP, destination IP, protocol
link source/destination MAC, ESSID, frame type, security
physical modulation, channel/frequency, RSS,
angle of arrival, location, device fingerprints
Table 10.1.: Example criteria for additional wireless firewall rules.
guardians could then benefit from rules that use the sender location in their
decision and detect spoofing attacks (Sheng et al., 2008).
Direction-based positioning. With antenna configurations such as di-
rectional antennas or antenna arrays, guardians can also gain capabilities of
position-based classification. These methods use the direction of arrival to
infer the position of a transmitter. Angle of arrival information has already
been shown to be valuable for securing WLANs (Xiong and Jamieson,
2010).
10.1.2. Link Signatures
A more complex method using physical layer information to position devices
is the use of link signatures (Patwari and Kasera, 2007). This method
is able to discern the position of two devices with a large probability using
spectral information and may be used to prevent spoofing and replay attacks.
10.1.3. Device Identification
This analysis method enables to uniquely identify transmitting devices (Danev,
Zanetti, et al., 2012). For example, the concept of device fingerprints (Brik
et al., 2008) uses imperfections in the TX chain of transmitters to associate
packets to the transceiver hardware used. These features are stable and
unique enough to identify devices even from the same production line. This
technique can be used to whitelist trusted devices, blocking adversaries that
cannot mimic the physical layer behavior of the devices.1
1While spoofing can still be achieved (Danev, Luecken, et al., 2010), the attacker must
increase its effort significantly.
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10.2. Technical Considerations
10.2.1. Additional Communication Technologies
Our experimental results show that effective remote protection using the
wireless firewall is feasible. While our implementation presented here is specif-
ically designed for 802.15.4, adaptations for different technologies are mainly
a matter of exchanging the detector for different standards, and choosing an
effective jamming waveform. Probably, the most crucial factor remains the re-
action time. Nevertheless, when considering other technologies, the duration
of an ACK frame for 802.11g (without legacy devices) is tpacket ≈ 30 µs, while
our current prototype implementation reacts in 20 µs. This shows that even
high-speed communication standards such as WLAN can be targeted with
the system described here. First steps in this direction are made by Berger
et al. (2014). The authors present a programmable jamming system based
on modified off-the-shelf WLAN access points that supports a limited rule
set for 802.11g and 802.11n technologies.
Still, it is true that other standards may contain anti-jamming measures
that would impede the operation of a wireless firewall. However, in contrast
to adversarial jamming attacks, the network nodes want the protection of
WiFire. As a part of the administrated infrastructure we have access to net-
work knowledge, i.e., we can assume to know secret sequences (e.g., spreading
or hopping) and can easily counter spread spectrum techniques. With knowl-
edge of the algorithms used, this can also overcome interference cancellation
techniques recently explored (Halperin, Anderson, et al., 2008), so that
such future networks can still benefit from the service of wireless firewalls.
Overcoming more sophisticated anti-jamming techniques may be harder to
implement but the basic argument still holds. This knowledge allows us to
design tailored jamming signals that are the most effective against the devices
in the network.
10.2.2. Optimal Guardian Deployment
Operating on the physical layer has benefits but also generates new challenges:
we must aim to detect any packet that might arrive at a network node, and
ensure that all violating packets are destroyed. These issues make the position
and number of guardians important factors during deployment of the guardian
system, and an optimization based on analytical models along the lines of
Chapter 5.1 would be desirable. Methods that may be applied for this purpose
are presented in information theory literature in the context of physical layer
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confidentiality in wireless networks Kim et al. (2012) and Sankararaman
et al. (2012). These results suggest that by using a security perimeter around
the network attacks can be mitigated completely because no network devices
are then located in the attack range from all reachable attacker locations.
Alternatively, a training phase or site survey can be helpful to support the
optimization of the guardian deployment. As several WiFire instances can
co-exist, we can effectively increase the protected area by replication, and to
jam in a cooperative manner to increase the jamming effectiveness.
10.3. Non-technical Considerations
In this section, we consider non-technical aspects that can affect the operation
of wireless firewall devices. We discuss the economic and legal aspects that
must be considered when using controlled interference.
10.3.1. Economic Aspects
The WiFire devices are additional infrastructure that is deployed alongside
the wireless network. While this offers several benefits (central control, on-
demand security, or the possibility to “patch” legacy networks), it may raise
the question of cost. The number of additional devices depends on the WSN
deployment area and on the desired level of protection. Thus, the cost per
device should be small; one option is to implement the system with COTS
transceiver and micro-controller chips, possibly sacrificing flexibility. On the
other hand, recent results also show that it is possible to build cheaper (approx-
imately US$ 100) and more energy-efficient SDR platforms (Dutta, Kuo, et
al., 2010). However, even in the current implementation with USRP2 software-
defined radios, the price of approximately US$ 2,000 is still acceptable for a
development platform.
10.3.2. Legal Aspects
The intentional generation of interference may raise the concern whether our
guardians can be operated legally. In general, this question is not simple to
answer because the rules governing spectrum access vary across countries
and frequency bands. The U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (2010) mandates
in §15.5 that “harmful interference,” an emission that “obstructs or repeat-
edly interrupts a radiocommunications service operating in accordance with
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[Chapter 15],” is forbidden. However, as we limit the interference to adversar-
ial packets by analyzing and deciding on a per-packet basis, we might argue
that no “service” is interrupted.
Regarding unintentional interference with co-existing networks, we point
out that the guardian accesses the channel scarcely. The guardian emits a
26 µs signal per packet and is silent for the rest of the time (e.g., 998µs for
32 byte packets). From the view of a single channel, such a behavior is also
observed for frequency hopping systems such as Bluetooth. In fact, Bluetooth
Power Class 1 devices (ieee .. (2005, Sec. 7.2)) use the same transmit
power (100mW) as our guardians and occupy a 2MHz ieee .. channel
for approximately 25ms per second, which is comparable to the emissions
of a guardian reacting to an attacker with maximum rate (1000 packets/s).
This also shows that attacking the guardian infrastructure itself (by delib-
erately triggering interference) leads only to a limited channel occupancy.
In addition, as we consider the operation in the 2.4GHz band, co-existing
devices such as ieee . receivers commonly filter out the simple sinu-
soidal waveform we chose. Thus, while a comprehensive discussion of the
legal aspects of RF interference is out of scope for this paper (as well as out
of our expertise), we observe that the selective and efficient operation of the
guardians effectively limits interference, and finally remark that sometimes
legislation follows technical innovation.
10.4. Using WiFire for Interference Research
While the concept of protecting sensor networks with the guardian system is
our main focus, we note that the generation of selective interference can also
be useful for research on the effects of interference on network performance,
allowing to perform repeatable experiments with real hardware. Related work
in this area uses sensor mote hardware for interference generation, which limits
the capabilities of such interference generation systems (Boano, Voigt, et
al., 2011; Z. He and Voigt, 2011). Using the selective and protocol-aware
interference generation capabilities of WiFire, a more fine-grained control
over interference can be achieved. For example,WiFire can be deployed in a
wireless testbed to generate arbitrary interference patterns based on packet
content. In this spirit, the guardians may enforce that all ACK packets of a
chosen device are lost, or 10% of all network traffic is affected by microwave/
WLAN/Bluetooth-like interference following a bursty pattern.
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10.4.1. Interference in Experiments
The performance of a wireless network under interference is hard to predict
for several reasons. First, a packet may still survive interference depending
on the circumstances: the positions of sender, receiver, and interferer; the
propagation environment; the resistance of the receiver against the particular
type of interference; or the use of coding to recover damaged packets (e.g.,
(Liang et al., 2010)). Second, the interference may exhibit patterns that
harm network performance disproportionately, e.g., by destroying a packet
and all corresponding retransmissions. Analytical treatment or simulations
of network protocols often require simplifying assumptions to keep the eval-
uation treatable. For example, instead of complex channel models that are
required to capture physical wave interactions in realistic environments, only
simple fading models such as path distance or log-normal shadowing are often
used. Another example is that the concurrent use of different medium access
protocols may break the assumption of independence of interference events,
which is often assumed to keep the analysis simple.
Because of these issues real-world experiments are widely used to explore
the performance of protocols in realistic settings. The goal is to show that the
protocol performs as intended in a representative environment. Still it is very
challenging to reproduce experimental results in other environments (and
oftentimes even in the same environment). To increase comparability and
repeatability, researchers started to build and share testbeds where experi-
ments can be performed under stable conditions. Yet, even in these controlled
environments, interference is still problematic in experimentation, especially
its repeatable and reliable generation. A common approach to interference
generation is to deploy COTS devices in the testbed (e.g., using WLAN access
points or sensor motes) and program them to send packets at random times
or with a fixed rate. While this approach yields insights in the performance of
a protocol in crowded settings, it is neither realistic nor repeatable (Boano,
Z. He, et al., 2009). Another approach is to record interference patterns
and replay them during the experiment. For example, Boano, Voigt, et al.
(2011) show that sensor motes may be programmed to precisely capture and
generate interference in a sensor network testbed.
Despite these efforts, the effects of interference are still a “black box” to
experimenters. Even if exactly the same interference pattern is reproduced,
the response of the network may deteriorate from its previous behavior be-
cause of small timing differences or internal system effects, leading to differing
execution traces and a different performance. Oftentimes the response of the
network is the parameter of interest (e.g., the packet reception ratio), not
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the duty cycle of the interferers. What we need is protocol-aware interference
that also takes the state of the network into consideration, allowing direct
control of these parameters.
10.4.2. Interference Scripting
The idea is to deploy dedicated interferers in the testbed that are programmed
and controlled individually from a central point by adapting WiFire’s archi-
tecture. Each device monitors the channel, detects packets, and generates
interference in response to packet and timing events according to a supplied
script. We briefly describe the necessary changes to support scripting for a
wide range of application scenarios.
Scripting
In the existing system, we use a classification system similar to firewall rules.
While this concept is already sufficient for some realistic interference scenar-
ios, there are more components required for a fully featured experimental
system. The vision is that these components can be combined to define arbi-
trary interference patterns in a script, using control structures like loops and
conditions. The script ties together the following conditions to select packets
for interference:
Packet content. Access to the packet content is an important step to
protocol-awareness; it allows to restrict interference to packets with a chosen
source/destination, to packet types, or bits in the payload. The real-time
demodulation of WiFire allows this access to the content 4 µs after the corre-
sponding physical layer symbol was on the air.
Timing. To support pre-recorded interference patterns or to occupy the
channel for measuring the performance of carrier-sense based protocols, the
system must also support scheduled interference. The USRP2 supports a
timing precision of 10 ns and transmission timestamps that allow this mode
of operation.
Randomness. Because blocking all packets of a kind is not a realistic
interference scenario (when no adversarial setting is considered), we need a
way to define interference patterns that follow random distributions of choice,
e.g., 30% of the packets with bursty interference. This feature requires the
implementation of random sources with distributions of interest.
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Protocol state. State information enables interference decisions with mem-
ory. Taking a trace of packets into consideration, this enables white box testing
of wireless protocols, triggering interference only when a sequence of packets
was previously detected. For example, a node may loose its connection to
surrounding nodes each time it successfully associates with the network.
Interference waveforms. To generate interference patterns using multi-
ple communication standards, or to mimic unintentional interferers such as
microwave ovens, we need a way to choose interfering waveforms on a per-
packet basis. The USRP2 supports arbitrary sequences of samples as digital
representation of waveforms, allowing to store or compute them on-the-fly.
10.4.3. Application Examples
Next, we describe some possible applications of interference scripting.
Protocol-aware interference. With our approach, it is possible to define
fine-grained interference patterns, e.g., targeting specific MAC layer packets
such as ACKs to debug the interaction between application and OS layer
software (this approach was used in related work to discover race conditions
in the Contiki operating system (Z. He and Voigt, 2011)). However, in
contrast to that work, our system does not rely on timing information, such
that we can decide if interference is required and start it before the packet
is over. An application of this is to target neighborhood discovery messages
(used in routing protocols) to observe the behavior of the network in such
adverse conditions.
Virtual topologies. By selectively interfering with packets based on their
header addresses, we can define and enforce virtual topologies by blocking a
subset of neighbors, or making links between nodes directional. This increases
the control of the experimenter over the topology, and adds flexibility to an
existing testbed. For example, it can alleviate the need of physically rearrang-
ing devices in the network, or help to evaluate the behavior of protocols in
changing environments rapidly.
Arbitrary loss processes. Targeting packets directly allows to choose
which random distribution the packet loss process should follow. This allows
to compare the performance of protocols under the same conditions, e.g.,
using 70% packet loss with interference bursts. Even if the protocols are
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operating differently, e.g., using different medium access strategies, we can
control the interference patterns precisely because we are not relying on
timing but targeting packets directly. This is also important when comparing
results to simulations because the same random distributions can be used.
This enables direct comparison between simulated results and observations
from the real system.
Arbitrary waveforms. Emulating different devices in the vicinity (mi-
crowave ovens, baby phones, WLAN or ZigBee devices) is also an important
application, which can be combined with the previous strategies to choose
the interfering shape for each packet individually.
10.5. Summary
We noted that the scope of wireless firewalls can be extended in several
dimensions. By applying new types of rules that codify the physical layer
characteristics of trusted and untrusted communications, the decision process
can integrate these new features and thus allow the definition of attacks
that cannot be prevented when looking at the packet content alone, such as
replay attacks. The consideration of ieee .. in this thesis followed the
insight that the physical layer can readily be analyzed and implemented, and
a similar approach to MAC layer protection would have been much more
difficult. Still, there exists a large number of interesting applications for the
wireless firewall concept in other areas, such as local and wide area data
networks or cellular networks. Finally, the system that is described in this
thesis can also be applied to other areas in the context of wireless research,
e.g., to support experiments that explore the effects of interference to network
performance.
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11. Conclusion
11.1. Summary
In this thesis, we presented the concept of a firewall for wireless networks, a
system that provides centralized channel access control to protect devices that
cannot fend for themselves. By operating on the physical layer, it is possible
to offer this protection transparently, i.e., the guarded devices can continue to
operate without any notion that they are being protected. This means that no
additional, energy-consuming security protocols are necessary, and that the
wireless firewall is a passive device that only monitors the wireless channel
when no attack is taking place. This is in contrast to conventional security
mechanisms, which put an additional burden to a network constantly. Due
to the selective policy enforcement of the wireless firewall, the security policy
can be adapted easily to protect against new threats, or to accommodate for
changes in the network, e.g., in the network topology. We analyzed the effects
of RF interference on the reception process and showed that only a limited
amount of interference is required to effectively block wireless transmissions,
and that even simple waveforms achieve a good jamming success rate. Finally,
the design, implementation, and system evaluation of WiFire substantiated
the claim that a remote protection using RF interference is feasible, even in
challenging indoor scenarios.
11.2. Future Work
The research on this novel concept is only at its beginning, there are many
issues that must be addressed before we will see wireless firewalls in the
wild. These issues range from a more detailed understanding of the protec-
tion properties of wireless firewalls, and a subsequent deployment strategy
of guardian devices in challenging environments, e.g., indoor offices with co-
existing WLAN networks, moving people and other variable RF attenuators,
and severe multipath fading effects. Another important issue is to identify
scenarios where access control on the physical layer is really necessary and
cannot be performed equally well or even better. While there are applica-
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tions where the wireless firewall is a good contender, e.g., restricting WLAN
communication of prison inmates while keeping up your own connectivity or
a mobile jamming system that prevents the detonation of roadside bombs,
the applications of wireless firewalls are certainly much narrower than for
wired firewalls. This thesis only provided the first steps on the way to access
control on the physical layer.
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A. Pulse Integration
A central equation for deriving the influence of individual bits on the de-
modulator output is the integration of the superposition of time shifted unit
pulses Π (t) (defined in equation (4.4)). This is especially important because
of signal time offsets τ that shift the pulses relative to the integration interval.
Situations that arise are shown in Figure A.1.
To this end, we first derive the general result to the integration over one bit
interval k for arbitrary, integrable functions f (t). We consider two variants,
the integration of in-phase bits, and the special case of integrating quadrature-
phase bits in the bounds of I-bits (which happens when Q-bits leak into the
I-phase), i.e.,
SIk (f) =
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
bI (t− τ) f (t) dt
SQk (f) =
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
bQ (t− τ) f (t) dt.
Our approach is to split each equation into two parts where the unit pulse
is the constant 1 function to simplify the equations. Since only one pulse is
active at any point in time, such splitting is possible.
Integrating Bit Pulses During the I Integration
Interval
Integration of I-bits
To perform the integration, we first derive the two indices that have active
pulses during the integration interval. The shift introduced by τ lead to the
two new bits with indices k′ = k−⌊ τ
2T
⌋
and k′−1. The remaining time offset
inside the selected bits is τ = τ − 2kτT , i.e., each of the two bits is active
for the time interval τ and 2T − τ , respectively. Because of this definition,
the values of τ are restricted to the interval [0, 2T )—negative values would
activate previous bits, which is prevented by the floor operation.
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Time offset
τ = 0
τ = −T
τ
βI0
2T
βI0
T
βI1
T
βIk′−1
τ
βIk′
2T − τ
In-phase integration interval for bit k = 0
Figure A.1.: Examples of active bits in the integration interval for the I-bit
k. For τ = 0, the only active bit in the integration interval is
βI0 . When the signal starts half a bit-length too early (τ = −T ),
there are two bits βI0 and βI1 that contribute equally to the bit
decision, both are active for a duration of T . In the general case
of a time offset τ , there are two active bits with indices βIk′−1 and
βIk′ , with an active time duration of τ and 2T − τ , respectively.
For the in-phase component, we derive
SIk (f)
=
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
bI (t− τ) f (t) dt
=
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
bI (t− 2kτT − τ) f (t) dt
=
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
∞∑
k=−∞
βIkΠ
(
t− τ − (k + kτ ) 2T
2T
)
f (t) dt
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Re-labeling the bit indices k to k′ (note: positive time shifts lead to negative index shifts)
=
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
(
βIk−1Π
(
t− τ − (k − 1) 2T
2T
)
+ βIkΠ
(
t− τ − 2kT
2T
))
f (t) dt
= βIk−1
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
Π
(
t− τ − (k − 1) 2T
2T
)
f (t) dt+ βIk
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
Π
(
t− τ − 2kT
2T
)
f (t) dt
Use the fact that the shifted pulses are zero during parts of the integration interval
= βIk−1
ˆ (2k−1)T+τ
(2k−1)T
Π
(
t− τ − (k − 1) 2T
2T
)
f (t) dt+ βIk
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T+τ
Π
(
t− τ − 2kT
2T
)
f (t) dt
The Π pulses are constant 1 in the new integration intervals
= βIk−1
ˆ (2k−1)T+τ
(2k−1)T
f (t) dt+ βIk
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T+τ
f (t) dt
= βIk−1
[
F (t)
]2kT−T+τ
2kT−T
+ βIk
[
F (t)
]2kT+T
2kT−T+τ
If the function to integrate is the constant 1 function (f (t) = 1), then we
derive
SIk (1) = τβ
I
k−1 + (2T − τ) βIk (A.1)
Integration of Q-bits
When Q bits leak into the in-phase, we have the consider the additional shift
of T due to the staggering of bits in the MSK modulation. We provide the
derivation of this special case here. First, we substitute the timing offset
τ with τQ = τ + T to accommodate of the staggering. Second, the bit
indices must be re-adjusted because of the shift; the new index is denoted by
kQ′ = k − b(τ + T ) /2T c. For the case of the constant 1 function, we derive
then
SQk (1) = τ
QβQ
kQ′−1 +
(
2T − τQ) βQ
kQ′ . (A.2)
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Deriving Special Cases: SIk (cos 2ωpt) and S
Q
k (cos 2ωpt)
Integration of I-bits
We derive the result of bit pulse integration for this special case.
SIk (cos 2ωpt)
=
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
bI (t− τ) cos 2ωpt dt
= βIk−1
[
1
2ωp
sin 2ωpt
](2k−1)T+τ
(2k−1)T
+ βIk
[
1
2ωp
sin 2ωpt
](2k+1)T
(2k−1)T+τ
=
βIk−1
2ωp
[
sin 2ωpt
](2k−1)T+τ
(2k−1)T
+
βIk
2ωp
[
sin 2ωpt
](2k+1)T
(2k−1)T+τ
Performing the integration results in (we denote ωpτ = ϕp):
=
βIk−1
2ωp
[
sin
(
(2k − 1)pi + 2ϕp
)
− sin ((2k − 1) pi)
]
+
βIk
2ωp
[
sin ((2k + 1) pi)− sin
(
(2k − 1) pi + 2ϕp
)]
=
βIk−1
2ωp
[
sin
(
−pi + 2ϕp
)
− sin (−pi)
]
+
βIk
2ωp
(
sin pi + sin 2ϕp
)
= −β
I
k−1
2ωp
sin 2ϕp +
βIk
2ωp
sin 2ϕp
= sin 2ϕp
(
−β
I
k−1
2ωp
+
βIk
2ωp
)
Using sin2ϕp = sin (2ωp (τ − 2kτT )) = sin (2ϕp − 2kτpi) = sin2ϕp
= − 1
2ωp
sin 2ϕp
(
βIk−1 − βIk
)
The overall result is
SIk (cos 2ωpt) = −
1
2ωp
sin 2ϕp
(
βIk−1 − βIk
)
(A.3)
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Integration of Q-bits
In this case, the use of τQ leads to a different phase shift ϕQp = ωp (τ + T ) =
ωpτ +
piT
2T
= ϕp +
pi
2
that leads to changes in the integration. Using the
following two simplifications the derivation can be performed analogously to
the previous subsection.
sin 2ϕQp = sin 2ωpτ
Q = sin
(
2
pi
2T
(
τQ − 2kQτ T
))
= sin
(
τQpi
T
− 2kQτ pi
)
= sin 2ϕQp
and
sin 2ϕQp = sin (2ϕp + pi) = − sin 2ϕp
The overall result is
SQk (cos 2ωpt) =
1
2ωp
sin 2ϕp
(
βQ
kQ′−1 − βQkQ′
)
(A.4)
Deriving Special Cases: SIk (sin 2ωpt) and SQk (sin 2ωpt)
Integration of I-bits
We derive the result of bit pulse integration for this special case.
SIk (sin 2ωpt)
=
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
bI (t− τ) sin 2ωpt dt
= βIk−1
[
− 1
2ωp
cos 2ωpt
](2k−1)T+τ
(2k−1)T
+ βIk
[
− 1
2ωp
cos 2ωpt
](2k+1)T
(2k−1)T+τ
= −β
I
k−1
2ωp
[
cos 2ωpt
](2k−1)T+τ
(2k−1)T
− β
I
k
2ωp
[
cos 2ωpt
](2k+1)T
(2k−1)T+τ
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Performing the integration results in (we denote ωpτ = ϕp):
= −β
I
k−1
2ωp
[
cos
(
(2k − 1)pi + 2ϕp
)
− cos ((2k − 1) pi)
]
− β
I
k
2ωp
[
cos ((2k + 1) pi)− cos
(
(2k − 1) pi + 2ϕp
)]
= −β
I
k−1
2ωp
(
cos
(
−pi + 2ϕp
)
− cos (−pi)
)
− β
I
k
2ωp
(
cos pi − cos
(
−pi + 2ϕp
))
= −β
I
k−1
2ωp
(
1− cos 2ϕp
)
+
βIk
2ωp
(
1− cos 2ϕp
)
= − 1
2ωp
(
1− cos 2ϕp
) (
βIk−1 − βIk
)
Using cos2ϕp = cos (2ωp (τ − 2kτT )) = cos (2ϕp − 2kτpi) = cos2ϕp
= − 1
2ωp
(1− cos 2ϕp)
(
βIk−1 − βIk
)
The overall result is
SIk (sin 2ωpt) = −
1
2ωp
(1− cos 2ϕp)
(
βIk−1 − βIk
)
(A.5)
Integration of Q-bits
This case can be performed analogously to Appendix A, with the following
two simplifications:
cos 2ϕQp = cos 2ωpτ
Q = cos
(
2
pi
2T
(
τQ − 2kQτ T
))
= cos
(
τQpi
T
− 2kQτ pi
)
= cos 2ϕQp
and
cos 2ϕQp = cos (2ϕp + pi) = − cos 2ϕp
The overall result is
SQk (sin 2ωp (t)) = −
1
2ωp
(1 + cos 2ϕp)
(
βQ
kQ′−1 − βQkQ′
)
(A.6)
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Demodulator Output
With the tools presented in Appendix A, we can now proceed to prove theo-
rem 4.1.
Theorem B.1. For an interfering MSK signal u (t) with parameters τ and
ϕc, the contribution to the demodulation output ΛIu (k) is given by
ΛIu (k) =
1
4
Au
{
cosϕc
[
cosϕp
(
τβIk−1 + (2T − τ) βIk
)− 2T
pi
sinϕp
(
βIk−1 − βIk
)]
− sinϕc
[
sinϕp
(
τQβQ
kQ′−1 +
(
2T − τQ) βQ
kQ′
)
+
2T
pi
cosϕp
(
βQ
kQ′−1 − βQkQ′
)]}
.
Proof. We first derive the resulting signal after demodulation (equation (4.7)).
u (t)φI (t)
= Au [bI (t− τ) cos (ωpt− ϕp) cos (ωct+ ϕc)
+bQ (t− τ) sin (ωpt− ϕp) sin (ωct+ ϕc)] [cosωpt cosωct]
= Au [(bI (t− τ) cos (ωpt− ϕp) cosωpt cos (ωct+ ϕc) cosωct)
+ (bQ (t− τ) sin (ωpt− ϕp) cosωpt sin (ωct+ ϕc) cosωct)]
=
Au
4
[(bI (t− τ) (cosϕp + cos (2ωpt− ϕp)) (cosϕc + cos (2ωct+ ϕc)))
+ (bQ (t− τ) (sin (−ϕp) + sin (2ωpt− ϕp)) (sinϕc + sin (2ωct+ ϕc)))]
We apply perfect lowpass filtering (?) to filter out high-frequency components (2ωct)
?
=
Au
4
[(bI (t− τ) cosϕc (cosϕp + cos (2ωpt− ϕp)))
+ (bQ (t− τ) sinϕc (sin (2ωpt− ϕp)− sinϕp))]
=
Au
4
[(bI (t− τ) cosϕc (cosϕp + cos 2ωpt cosϕp + sin 2ϕpt sinϕp))
+ (bQ (t− τ) sinϕc (− sinϕp + sin 2ωpt cosϕp − cos 2ωpt sinϕp))]
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The bit decision is performed by integration over the bit interval k.
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
u (t)φI (t) dt
=
Au
4
[
cosϕc
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
bI (t− τ) (cosϕp + cos 2ωpt cosϕp + sin 2ϕpt sinϕp) dt
+ sinϕc
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
bQ (t− τ) (− sinϕp + sin 2ωpt cosϕp − cos 2ωpt sinϕp) dt
]
=
Au
4
[cosϕcX1 + sinϕcX2]
We derive the results for both terms X1 and X2 individually in the following
two sections.
Putting the two results in equation (B.1) and equation (B.2) together, the
overall result is
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
u (t)φI (t) dt
=
Au
4
{
cosϕc
[
cosϕp
(
τβIk−1 + (2T − τ) βIk
)− 2T
pi
sinϕp
(
βIk−1 − βIk
)]
− sinϕc
[
sinϕp
(
τQβQ
kQ′−1 +
(
2T − τQ) βQ
kQ′
)
+
2T
pi
cosϕp
(
βQ
kQ′−1 − βQkQ′
)]}
Integrating the Term X1
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
bI (t− τ) (cosϕp + cos 2ωpt cosϕp + sin 2ϕpt sinϕp) dt
= cosϕp
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
bI (t− τ) dt+ cosϕp
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
bI (t− τ) cos 2ωpt dt
+ sinϕp
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
bI (t− τ) sin 2ωpt dt
= cosϕpS
I
k (1) + cosϕpS
I
k (cos 2ωpt) + sinϕpS
I
k (sin 2ωpt)
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By using the results in Appendix A (equations (A.1), (A.3) and (A.5)), we
can reformulate this equation to
= cosϕp
(
τβIk−1 + (2T − τ) βIk
)
− β
I
k−1
2ωp
(cosϕp sin 2ϕp + sinϕp (1− cos 2ϕp)) + β
I
k
2ωp
(cosϕp sin 2ϕp + sinϕp (1− cos 2ϕp))
Simplifying this equation yields the desired result.
= cosϕp
(
τβIk−1 + (2T − τ) βIk
)− (βIk−1 − βIk
2ωp
)
(sin 2ϕp cosϕp − cos 2ϕp sinϕp + sinϕp)
= cosϕp
(
τβIk−1 + (2T − τ) βIk
)− sinϕp
ωp
(
βIk−1 − βIk
)
= cosϕp
(
τβIk−1 + (2T − τ) βIk
)− 2T
pi
sinϕp
(
βIk−1 − βIk
)
In the second step in the previous derivation, we used the following simplifi-
cation:
sin 2ϕp cosϕp − cos 2ϕp sinϕp + sinϕp
= 2 cos2 ϕp sinϕp −
(
2 cos2 ϕp − 1
)
sinϕp + sinϕp
=
(
2 cos2 ϕp − 2 cos2 ϕp + 1 + 1
)
sinϕp
= 2 sinϕp
Overall, the result is
X1 = cosϕp
(
τβIk−1 + (2T − τ) βIk
)− 2T
pi
sinϕp
(
βIk−1 − βIk
)
(B.1)
Integrating the Term X2
We will now derive the second integral. We must use the rules for Q pulse
integration with I intervals (Appendix A).ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
bQ (t− τ) (− sinϕp − cos 2ωpt sinϕp + sin 2ωpt cosϕp) dt
= −
[ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
bQ (t− τ) sinϕpdt+
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
bQ (t− τ) cos 2ωpt sinϕpdt
−
ˆ (2k+1)T
(2k−1)T
bQ (t− τ) sin 2ωpt cosϕpdt
]
= −
[
sinϕpS
Q
k (1) + sinϕpS
Q
k (cos 2ωpt)− cosϕpSQk (sin 2ωpt)
]
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B. Colliding Packets Demodulator Output
By using the results in Appendix A (equations (A.2), (A.4) and (A.6)), we
can reformulate this equation to
= − sinϕp
(
τQβQ
kQ′−1 +
(
2T − τQ) βQ
kQ′
)
− 1
2ωp
(sinϕp sin 2ϕp + cosϕp (1 + cos 2ϕp))
(
βQ
kQ′−1 − βQkQ′
)
Simplifying yield the desired result
= − sinϕp
(
τQβQ
kQ′−1 +
(
2T − τQ) βQ
kQ′
)
− 1
2ωp
(sin 2ϕp sinϕp + cos 2ϕp cosϕp + cosϕp)
(
βQ
kQ′−1 − βQkQ′
)
= −
[
sinϕp
(
τQβQ
kQ′−1 +
(
2T − τQ) βQ
kQ′
)
+
2T
pi
cosϕp
(
βQ
kQ′−1 − βQkQ′
)]
In the last step, we used the following simplification
sin 2ϕp sinϕp + cosϕp + cos 2ϕp cosϕp
= 2 sin2 ϕp cosϕp + cosϕp +
(
1− 2 sin2 ϕp
)
cosϕp
=
(
2 sin2 ϕp + 1 + 1− 2 sin2 ϕp
)
cosϕp
= 2 cosϕp
Overall, the result is
X2 = −
[
sinϕp
(
τQβQ
kQ′−1 +
(
2T − τQ) βQ
kQ′
)
+
2T
pi
cosϕp
(
βQ
kQ′−1 − βQkQ′
)]
(B.2)
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